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ABSTRACT

This thesis

examines the characteristics of terrorism in the

new international environment following the Cold War in which

in

ternational terrorism is undergoing drastic changes in its sources
and characteristics.
The breakdown of the bipolar system and concomitant diffusion
of political power have given way to rivalry between regional sta
tes; especially, one of the key factors is the effect of weapons
proliferation on the dynamics of conflict between regional rivals
including nuclear, biological, and chemical-weapons capability.
The world is also confronting an assortment of prodemocracy and
anti-colonial movements which tend to erupt in civil disorder.
The above ingredients are currently fomenting the new environment
for terrorism.
This thesis first looks at the nature of terrorism and exam
ines the background to the issue; it then assesses how the inter
national environments characterizes the new trend of terrorism
that necessitates international cooperation to cope with it.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Discussion of

Current Settings of Terrorism

International terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon on the world
stage, although the use of terror has been around since biblical times.
And definition of terms relating to terrorism is constantly changing,
depending on which side of the ideological divide they are viewed. Some
older terms have been discarded and some new ones have become part of
our language. However, there is no denying that international terrorism
is inevitably conditioned by the existing international environment; and
it is one of the byproducts from distortion of world politics. The new
world order brought by the post Cold War situation, is also destined to
entail substantial influences upon the resources and of current
terrorism.

l . The End of Cold War Era
Since the end of World War II, international politics has been
dominated by the political and military confrontation between the United
States and Soviet Union. That competition, known generally as the Cold
War, developed with the restructuring of the international system.
In the post World War II climate, the major concern was whether the
two major powers could maintain the wartime collaboration. If they
could, the United Nations Charter provided a vehicle for them to
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organize peace around the principle of collective security (Chapter VII
of the Charter).

If the major powers could not maintain the war time

collaboration or competition, the Charter allowed them to form a
competitive alliance through Article 51, which provided for the
individual and collective self-defense of the members.
What would not determine collaboration or competition was whether
the two major powers could agree on a mutually acceptable world order
that could be enforced. They could not. America's world of liberal demo
cracies conflicted with Stalin's world of socialism and communism. The
result was the Cold War international system, in which the competition
between communism and anti-communism became the central international
concern. It took several years for the collaboration to break down and
for the competition to emerge. Collaboration was dead by 1947, though
the hardened rules of Cold War competition were not firmly in place
until June 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea.
Under the Cold War international system, it was widely believed in
Western society that the financial and psychological support by Eastern
bloc countries was a major Btimulant of the anti-American terrorist mo
vements in the 1970s and 1980s. Libya, Syria, and Cuba, were the three
countries most heavily linked to anti-western terrorism around the
world. This Cold War view shows that terrorism has become an attractive
strategy for the actors in international politics, preferable to
conventional or nuclear warfare, which has become too risky and too
expensive. Its use by hostile states gives terrorism the potential to
alter the international balance of power.1
The Cold War system now lies shattered. The most dramatic symbols
of its end include the revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the
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destruction of Berlin Wall, and ultimately, the demise of the Soviet
Union. Two major sets of dynamics came together to make the end of the
Cold War inevitable: First, the East-West military paralysis that was
caused largely by nuclear weapons; huge nuclear arsenals make nuclear
war inconceivable not only between countries that possess them, but also
because they can destroy societies worldwide. Any war between the
superpowers has the potential of becoming nuclear war and so has to be
avoided. It was precisely nuclear parity, the existence of nuclear
weapons on both sides, that has preserved the peace. Nuclear paralysis,
thereby, deters both nuclear and conventional military confrontations.
On the other hand, military competition between the superpowers became
expensive. Defense expenditures, many of which were devoted to East-West
matters, consumed twenty five percent of the Soviet GNP in the late
1980s.2 Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates reached the need to end the
competition, particularly considering the troubled economical times in
the Soviet Union.
Another major factor tied to the inevitable end of the Cold War was
the economical revolution of the 1980s, a phenomenon with opposite pulls
and effects. On one hand, the economies of the West experienced
unprecedented growth and prosperity during this time; on the other hand,
the economies of the countries of the Eastern Bloc specially in the
Soviet Union, failed to expand during the 1980s. The reasons for the
extraordinary growth in the West are complex, but three factors did play
important roles: the high technology revolution; internationalization of
economical activities; global privatization of the international
economy.3

Soviet socialism was failing. The Stalinist command economy, which
had been the envy of the world in the 1930s, was declining. In addition,
the Soviets were excluded from the high technology revolution that might
have stimulated their economy. The reason for their exclusion was that
most of the technologies were "dual use," with both civilian and
military threats, so the technologies were not shared with them. Thus,
the Soviet economy and economies of Eastern European countries declined
as the West grew. The gap became more obvious as the Western media
penetrated the East. The Cold War ended because Gorbachev knew his
country could not win the confrontation militarily, and because he
realized the hollow competition had become ruinously expensive. In
short, a military stalemate and economic necessity combined to produce
the end of the Cold War, the political and military division of Europe,
and the "enslaveement" of Eastern Europe.4
What are the post Cold War changes in the perspective of internat
ional terrorism? Russia becomes a more normal state

within the

international system. The first and most obvious change from this point
of view were changes in foreign policy, especially toward the Third
World. Before the rise of the new Russia, competing for influence with
the United States in the Third World was an important part of Soviet
policy—

a means for promoting communism and reinforcing Soviet power

worldwide without significantly raising the specter of military conflict
between the super powers (state sponsorship of terrorism as a tool of
foreign policy). New foreign policy renounced the Brezhinev doctrine,
which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of
beleaguered Socialist movements worldwide. It was replaced by the
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which asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of
beleaguered Socialist movements worldwide. It was replaced by the
assertion that the sovereignty right of nations should be honored
without interference. One result was to reduce the competition between
the East and West in Third World countries. Russia's motivation appeared
to be twofold. On the one hand, the competition was usually costly

and

the benefits of it short-lived; on the other hand. East West competition
in the Third World was just another irritant in overall relations in the
face of a need to reduce tension in order to gain access to Western
assistance.5

B. Regionalism

The new Security environment after the Cold War is currently
fomenting a new trend of international terrorism, even though it is
somewhat risky to attempt to isolate such characteristics, because the
world is still undergoing transformation.
- The breakdown of the bipolar system and concomitant diffu
sion of political power has resulted in rivalry between regional states,
especially in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Of particular
concern is the ongoing rivalry between China and Taiwan, South Korea and
North Korea, India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia,
Israel and Syria. These have all flared up periodically in the past but
they seem to have gained intensity in recent years as the inhibiting
influence of the superpowers declined and regional power equations
became more unsettled. Several countries would experience a fresh out
break of fighting in the latter 1990s.
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proliferation on the dynamics of conflict between regional rivals.
Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capabilities are now possessed
by numerous regional states, some of which have or are developing ball
istic means of delivery. This could invite a preemptive strike by a riv
al. Such strikes have taken place before (1981 Israel's attack on Iraq's
Ossirak reactor).
- The world is confronted with an assortment

of prodemocr

acy and anti-colonial movements, which tend to erupt periodically in st
rikes or civil disorders(source of dissident terrorism)/ or provoke vi
olence by the authorities(source of state or establishment terrorism).
They include: popular drive for Western style electoral democracy and
human rights, as have been working themselves out in Burma, China, Hai
ti, and the Philippines; struggles by disenfranchised minorities and
majorities to abolish unrepresentative or discriminatory governments
from Northern Ireland to the former South Africa; and efforts by subject
people to cast off what is viewed as colonial rule in the West Bank and
Gaza.

C. The Purpose of Thesis
This paper is to examine the difference of characteristics in the
post-Cold War international environment from that of Cold War era.
It will first examine the nature of terrorism and the background to the
issue.

Unfortunately, universally accepted definitions of terrorism do

not exist for the reasons that we will examine later. It is analyzed in
a wide perspective to help understand the implications in terms of roots
and causes; political and working level implications; academic freezing
of its characteristics; and other sociological background including its
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relationship with media.
Also analyzed in Chapter III, are the new international environment
and its source of terrorism. In this Chapter, I will first briefly touch
on the new shifting political landscape in the post Cold War situation,
and then introduce six forces that destabilize the world's security. The
forces are: the pull of economic forces; the global diffusion of power;
increased popular assertiveness at grass-roots level; the diminishing
power and authority of nation-state; the rise of the "weapon" with new
capability, and population growth and environmental decline.
This work then looks into the characteristics of post Cold War
terrorism in Chapter IV: it assesses how a new international environment
produced by the break-down of the bipolar system and concomitant
diffusion of political power, has given the impetus and characterized
the new trend of terrorism. First, it analyzes the elements which
qualify international or transnational terrorism and the mechanism of
contemporary state support terrorism, then proceeds to elaborate the
process of changes from polarized manipulation of terrorism by two
superpowers as an instrument of foreign policy to joint

anti-terrorist

efforts in global scale cooperating and sharing responsibility.
Second, it looks into the characteristics of current dissident
terrorism that are categorized into nationalist and revolutionist
terrorism It covers the world decomposing empire and superstates
(dissolution of Soviet Russia) as model cases of nationalist terrorism
(ethno-nationalism in war), and makes a case study in Bosnian affairs.
Though the appeal of Soviet-style communism has largely dissipated,
revolutionary and millenarian movements continue to hold an attraction
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for dispossessed people. As regards revolutionist terrorism, this paper
discusses two main types of revolutionary crusade at present:
ideological or political movements attempting to end exploitation of the
poor by the rich; and religious fundamentalism, a drive to subject all
social interaction to religious law and practice.
Third, since the use of terrorist violence and repression by states
against their own citizens is a common phenomenon, even in post Cold War
era, establishment(state) terrorism is covered in some depth: in terms
of the relationship of state to society; characteristics of state
terrorism; and conditions associated with the emergence of terrorism.
And, a case study is made of "Iraqi State Terrorism

to the Kurdish

Minority.”
Terrorism can be reduced but not eradicated, because however
democratic a society, however near to perfection the social institution,
there will be always alienated and disaffected people, some of whom will
be aggressive and more interested in violence than in freedom and
tolerance (the source of terrorism). The reaction to the terrorist,
therefore, could not be ignored because fortunes of terrorism depend
largely on the response it encounters both from the public and the
authorities. In the post Cold War era, there exists no distinctive
leader in world community. This situation inevitably requires
international cooperation among responsible nations to cope with
terrorism through world organization. This will be briefly touched on in
the conclusion.

C. Literature
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Since 1945, political violence literature, including terrorism, has
evolved seemingly to keep pace with events, and has grown enormously
during the last two decades. The problem with literature about terrorism
is how accurate is the literature of the secret struggle and how much of
it can we believe? The problem is compounded by an actual disinformation
game being played on the reader in many instances by various secret
agencies and legislatures around the world. In the past, the literature
appearing in the media of communist and certain leftist countries has
been so filled with ideology, propaganda, and inaccuracy that it remains
virtually impossible to unravel the truth from the lie.
In the United States, the literature has fluctuated according to
time and purpose. The most accurate journal, the CIA's quarterly Studies
In Intelligence, is classified and not available to the public. The
other, Covert Action Information Bulletin, while not classified, is
extremely difficult to obtain by the layperson.6
Professor Harry Howe Ransome in his article "Strategic Intelligence
and Foreign Policy"

suggests that literature about international

political violence may be classified in three different ways: First,
there is the "memoir," a publication by former members of the secret war
establishment. Next there is the "muckraking" product, a whistle blowing
expose which can often provide certain insight but usually fails the
standard test of serious scholarship. Finally, there is the "objective
analysis" a scholarly work prepared by a professional specialist in
history or another social science, which examine "How the system works
in

specific historical contexts."
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Myron J. Smith Jr., the author of The Secret Wars: A Guide to
Sources in English advises as a rule of thumb that secret war literature
must be treated with a certain skepticism, adopt the code of the
"investigative" journalist, and accept no fact that cannot be verified
in a at least two or three overt sources.7 This is understandable; if
everyone knew

what is going on and truthfully reported it, the secret

political violence would not be secret.
As noted earlier, the literature on terrorism has grown enormously
in the last two decades. Of the existing bibliographies and guide books
the most recent and comprehensive is Alex P. Schmidt Political Terrorism
(Amsterdam, 1983; New Burnswick, 1986). The following

should also be

mentioned: Augustus R.Norton and Martin H. Greenberg, International
Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide (Boulder, Colora
do, 1980); and Edward Mickolus, The literature of Terrorism(Westport,
Conn.,1980). Another useful handbook is Peter Janke, Guerrilla and
Terrorist Organization (New York,1983), Also L. Bonanate, La Violenza
Politika nel mundo contempolaneo (Milan, 1979; M.J. Smith Jr.

The

Secret
Wars, vol, III: Terrorism 1960-1980 (Santababara, 1980).
there is no truly international guide in this respect.
Terrorism

Unfortunately
The Quarterly

has published over the years many articles, documents and

reports on conferences.

Documents concerning the history of terrorism

can be found in the Terrorism Reader (New York, 1978: new revised edn
1987), edited by the present writer.8
The books I have referred to, other than those listed in reparation
of this work, are attached in a separate bibliography.

XI

1 Crenshaw, Martha. 1989,10, Terrorism and International Cooperation,
New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies.
2 Snow,Donald M. 1992,6, Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and New
International Order, New York: St. Martin's Press.
3 Snow, 7.
4 Snow, 8-9.
5 Snow,10-13
6 Smith, Myron J. Jr. 1980, 15-18, The Secret War: A guide to Sources in
English. Volume 1, Santa Barbara, Ca.: Center for the Study of Armament
and Disarmament, U.C.L.A.
7 Smith J r .,20.
8 Laqueur, Walter,1987,323-24, Age of Terrorism, Toranto & Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.

CHAPTER

II

THE ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM

A. Complexity of Defining of Terrorism
The Term "Terrorism" and "terrorist," are of a relatively recent
date: the meaning of terrorism was given in the 1798 supplement of the
Dictionnaire of the academic FranCaise as 'system regime de la terreur.'
^Terror' originally referred to a period characterized by political exe
cution, as during the French Revolution from May 1793 to July 1794. All
together at least 300.000 people were arrested during the Reign of Ter
ror and 17,000 were officially tried and executed, while many died in
prison or without a trial.
The distinctive phenomena of our time, labeled as "terrorism,"
and "political violence" are steadily magnifying their intensity in re
cent years. Yet there is no universally or even generally accepted con
ception 2 of what entails "terrorism" and "terrorist activities" where
"political violence" by individuals and

groups, or a sovereign states

against its people, or one state or international entity against

an

other, begins and ends. The author of a recent research guide to the
concepts, Theory and Literature on Political Terrorism has collected 109
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different definitions provided by various writers between 1936 and 1981.
There is every reason to assume that there have been more since. 2 *
Most authors agree that terrorism is the use or the threat

of the

use of violence, a method of combat, or strategy to achieve a certain
targets that it aims to induce a state of fear in the victims, that it
is ruthless and does not confirm with humanitarian rules, and that pub
licity is ah essential factor in the terrorist strategy. However, beyond
these points definitions diverge, since high political stakes inevitably
mean that many definitions are formulated to serve particular political
agenda.
Former Senator Jermiah Denton, in his introduction to the AntiTerrorist Act of 1984, provides an example of the Western type defini
tion:
Terrorism means the knowing use of force or violence against
any person or property in violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or any state, territory, possession, or district,
with the intent to intimidate, coerce, or influence a government or
person in furtherance of any political or ideological objective. 3

Some nonaligned nations, with the following

definition, clearly

seek to reclassify in favor of liberation movements, the form of coer
cion considered "terrorist." Terrorism for them, consists of :

Acts of violence and other repressive acts by colonial, rac
ist,
.■ and alien regimes against people struggling for their libera
tion ..
tolerating or assisting by a state or organization.4

B. Working Definition

These statistics come from InTer 85: A Review of International Terror
ism in 1985, and similarly for 1986 and 1987, published by the Jerusalem
Post and Jaffee Center for Strategy of Tel Aviv University.
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All specific definitions of terrorism have their shortcomings sim
ply because reality is always richer or more complicated than any gener
alization. Unlike some chemical elements, there is no such a thing as
pure, unalloyed, unchanging terrorism, but there are many forms of ter
rorism.
Even though a comprehensive, generally accepted definition of ter
rorism does not exist and is unlikely to come into existence, a working
definition is certainly not beyond our reach: in any case, political de
cision makers will not wait for a consensus to emerge among political
scientists before they take the measures they deem necessary

to combat

terrorism. Physicians use many drugs, even though their exact physio
logical effects remain a mystery. What applies to

medicine should be

acceptable in the study of terrorism.
According to the definition of a US task force in the 1 9 6 0 s , t e r 
rorists engage in a "certain type of criminal activity."
Subsequent definitions by various branches of US Government were
slightly

more cautious, but they all mention the "specific use of

force" (Department of Defense, States and Justice, and the FBI). This is
certainly true inasmuch as —

terrorism violates both international and

domestic laws. The application of the lethal norm is of little help in
establishing the political character of a terrorist movement; plotters
against Hitler also tried to use forces unlawfully, and the same is true
of the rebels in Afghanistan and many other such groups.

A 1983 Depart-

See U.S. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice, Standard,
and Goals, Report of Task Force on Disorder and Terrorism (Washington
DC.,1976). Also see FBI Terrorist Research and Analyst Center,
Terror
ism in the United States: 1990 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Jus
tice, 1991) .
*

15

ment of Defense definition emphasizes the use of force
"revolutionary organization," and the State Department

or violence by a
mentioned in 1984

"Noncombatant targets." Both were controversial statements. The vicepresident's

Task Force on combating terrorism (Bush Committee, 1986)

used a definition that is the mixture of those previously used by other
government departments. It reads as follows: "unlawful use or threat of
violence against persons or property to further political or social ob
jectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government,
individuals, or groups, or to modify their behavior or politics."5
'Terrorism,' of course, is

in contravention of the laws of the land and

of international law, but application of legal norms presents certain
difficulties, legitimate resistance (legitimate according to natural
law) against tyrants is also

criminal if seen in this light.

Unlike some chemical elements, there is no such a thing as pure,
unalloyed, unchanging terrorism, but there are many forms of terrorism.
In some circumstances, a case can be made for broader and, of necessity,
vague definitions, such as the one that appears in British Prevention of
Terrorist Act of 1974. This Act states that, for the purpose of legisla
tion, terrorism is the "use of violence for political ends, and includes
any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section
of the public in fear." For instance, mass violence in the form of a
riot, violent demonstrations, street battles or civil war.
A working definition of terrorism also has to be examined in the
global level of perspective. Although the international community ap
pears to recognize the need for cooperation against terrorism, national
interests have dominated the treatment of the issue and unanimity has
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been rhetorical rather than practical. The issue of opposition terrorism
appeared on the international agenda of the post-World War Il-world only
in 1972, as a result of the attack by the Black September organization
on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games. An American initiative
(The Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts
of International Terrorism) was rejected. Subsequent efforts to draw up
a treaty to submit to the General Assembly foundered on the issue of de
fining terrorism, which split Third World and Western states. Their dif
ferences centered on the issues of whether terrorism can be considered
in isolation from the causes, which the Third World conceived to be ra
cism and colonialism. The Third World insisted that state "terrorism" or
oppression was the real priority.
However, as oppositional terrorism came to threaten more and more
states; a body of international laws developed in a specific and limited
area. Its approach was not to make "terrorism" a crime, given the
imprecision and ambiguity of the term, but to outlaw the specific
actions that are the components of terrorist strategies, such as hijack
ings or attacks on diplomatic agents. In 1973, the Convention on Preven
tion and Punishment of crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
including diplomatic agents urged international coordination to prevent
attacks on diplomats. In 1979, the General Assembly adopted interna
tional convention on Prevention Against Taking of Hostage. Finally, in
December 1905, the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning ter
rorism regardless of occasion or cause.
Since Gorbachev's accession to power, the former Soviet Union has
expressed a new and specific interest in reducing international terror
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ism. In his speech to the 27th Congress of the CPSU in 1987, Gorbachev
proposed that the development of effective ways of combating interna
tional terrorism be made part of a comprehensive international system.
These changes seemed more than rhetorical.

Soviet policy toward the

Third World and national liberation movements appears to be undergoing
parallel revisions, although the meaning of these changes in thinking
and behavior is a source of dispute among Western analysts. The agree
ment on human rights reached by the conference on Security and Coopera
tion in Europe in January 1989 is proof of the then Soviet and East
European interest in cooperating with the West against terrorism. The
agreement, signed by the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and All
European nations except Albania, contains a provision condemning terror
ism as unjustifiable under any circumstances.
Implementation of the convention has been inconsistent; however,
John F. Murphy, expressing a general consensus among American Interna
tional law specialists, concludes: "The effectiveness of these global
conventions as anti-terrorist measure is questionable. Even if fully im
plemented, limited and piecemeal solutions of these conventions would be
of little use in combating

the many manifestations of terrorism." 6

In short, the problem of terrorism is complicated, and what can be
said without fear of contradiction about a terrorist group in one coun
try is by no means true for other groups at other times and other socie
ties. Different countries have different notions about the legitimacy of
terrorism, which became manifest in various working definitions of ter
rorism.

All these working definitions are of little consequence to aca

demic attempts of the conception.
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C. Isolating Characteristics of Terrorism.
In defining the concept of terrorism for the purpose of analysis it
is critical to isolate terrorism from specific political goals; that is,
all nationalists, revolutionists or far right extremists are not terror
ist. No particular ideology or religion is responsible for terrorism.
Terrorism as a mean is logically separable from the ends it purportedly
serves. This approach has been necessary to the formation of interna
tional law on the subject, which has focused on the component parts of
terrorism, such as hijacking or diplomatic kidnapping, in order to treat
them

as crimes as indicated above.
If one accepts that terrorism is a specific and identifiable type

of political violence, then its attributes must be listed:
First, it is an organized and purposeful activity, not a spontane
ous reaction to circumstances.
Second, terrorism involves violence perceived as unacceptable by
society because of its cruelty and unexpectedness. The form of violence
itself may be horrifying, such as mid-air explosions of airliners or
kidnapping.
Third, terrorism usually occurs in situations of peace rather than
war, and comes as a surprise to its victims. A particularly salient
characteristic of this form of violence is the usual innocence of

its

victims, who are noncombatants, not prepared to defend themselves
against attack, and only in the most tenuous way, responsible for the
action of the government that terrorists oppose. The victims of terror
ism are often those who bear the least offensive intention toward the
terrorists —

airline passengers, journalists, diplomats, educators,

business executives and other civilians. Random assaults on civilian
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populations are not a new form of terrorism; the anarchists and Irish
nationalists of the nineteenth century threw bombs into crowded restau
rants

or concealed them in subway or train stations. Modern terrorists

are more likely to choose this tactic rather than the traditional reli
ance on assassination of heads of state, prominent officials who are now
well protected. Terrorists prefer easy targets. Yet the technical de
structiveness of modern terrorism —

the capacity of exploding bombs of

sufficient force to kill hundreds of people —

appears to coincide with

a lessening of moral inhibitions about the use of violence. This erosion
of inhibition may be due in part to the action of states whose brutali
ties against their own citizens in peace time and the use of strategic
bombing of cities in war time set an example of disregard for innocent
lives. Yet somehow, the psychological effects of oppositional terrorism
are more shocking to world sensibility.
Fourth. Terrorism is also distinguished by secrecy. Its perpetra
tors are anonymous, their identities deliberately concealed behind fa
cades of ordinariness or actual masks. Their violence is unexpected and
frightening not only because it violates conventional expectations of
behavior, but because their preparations are clandestine. Terrorists are
not easily recognizable as enemies. Thus terrorists can be considered a
form of deception.
Fifth. Terrorism is often referred to as the weapon of the weak,
since it is frequently the resort of small ideological groups that lack
a mass base. It is often a substitute for the mobilization of large num
bers of supporters. However, terrorist tactics can accompany large-scale
national movements. The Algerian FLN was responsible for the 1956-1957
campaign of bombing of European civilians in Algiers, which together
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with the severely repressive French response constituted the "Battle of
Algiers."
In turn, elements from the French military And the settled popula
tion of Algeria formed the terrorist Secret Army Organization

to stop

the movement toward independence. 7

D. Distinguishing from similar political violences
A frequent source of confusion is the lack of precision in termi
nology. The following example should suffice. When reporting the bomb
attacks at Rome and Vienna airports on December 28, 1985 by the members
of the Abu Nidal group, the London Financial Times used on its title
page the term "terrorist" and "gunmen," whereas on the second page ref
erence was made to "guerrillas." Terrorism

is often confused with guer

rilla warfare, since both activities involve low level violence (in
terms of physical destructiveness) by weaker parties in conflicts. Both
are convenient methods for challenging the power of the state. The rise
of the concept of "urban guerrilla warfare" in Latin America in the
1960s further confuses the issue. Difficulties in distinguishing between
the two are naturally compounded when Third World nationalist or revolu
tionary movements, with claims to substantial popular support or control
of territory, use methods that are essentially terrorist. There is a
tendency to type all users of terrorism as "terrorist organizations,"
as, for example, in the Israeli attitude toward the PLO. However, such a
label seems to be a misnomer when applied to groups that do not rely ex
clusively on terrorism, for which in effect terrorism may be a quite pe
ripheral tactic.

21

Another confusing problem is that in civil conflicts, the distinc
tion between combatants and noncombatants is blurred. Attempts to define
terrorism are in many ways' efforts to uphold that distinction. If ter
rorism is to be regarded as unacceptable violence, the rules for what is
acceptable violence must be established. Guerrilla warfare iB conven
tionally thought of as violence against military targets, primarily for
military effect, although it necessarily avoids prolonged engagements
with a more powerful government force. Its primary objectives are to
seize territory and control populations, neither of which is

a primary

goal of terrorism. 8

E. Typology of Terrorism by Perpetrator
Terrorism, as it has been emphasized, is a coercive tactic that may
be used for a variety of purposes by any side in a political contest.
Dissidents who cannot make their voices heard in the political arena and
regimes who cannot impose their will with the available formal instru
ment of rule may indeed succumb to the terrorist temptation. A more ef
fective understanding of the significance of terrorist tactics must be
sensitive to wilder contact within which terrorist events occur and how
they might be integrated into broader political strategies. We must nei
ther ignore how the norms that encourage radical politics relate to the
wilder political culture nor underestimate the utility of terrorism to
regimes.
By keeping these points in mind, we may better grasp the diversity
of political elements who use terrorist tactiCB. For the purpose of
classification, we may develop two more broadly construed forms of ter
rorism -- dissident and establishment. After examining the varieties of
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dissident and establishment terrorism, we are better able to make sense
of the popular, crosscutting categories of "international" and "statesponsored" terrorism. 9

1. Dissident Terrorism
Dissident groups deviate from, and perhaps attack, the dominant
system of power and values in a community. No community is blessed with
complete consensus, but in most political communities certain values
will be dominant and these will reinforce, by and large, a particular
distribution of power. Those who believe themselves deprived under such
a distribution, either because it discriminates against their values or
power is insufficient to accomplish their aspiration, will come into
conflict with this dominant order.
Dissident groups may be distinguished and compared according to the
comprehensiveness and coherence of their political objective -- what we
might term their ideological agenda. Such a comparison among types of
dissident movements that may use terrorism is as follows: 10
a. Criminal Terrorism
Criminal groups lack coherent ideological programs and usually sim
ply pursue their own enrichment, but they do attend to the operation of
the state, especially when it comes to protecting their activities. One
disturbing instance of this form of criminal violence is what has come
to be called "narcoterrorism," especially as it afflicts the South
American country of Colombia. Narcoterrorism on the scale practiced in
Colombia was not a "non-political" event -- the very independence of Co
lombian institution is at stake.11
b. Nihilist Terrorism
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Nihilists possess some systematic political agenda but it is essen
tially negative, the destruction of the existing order. They devote lit
tle if any thought to what follows destruction, beyond some vague an
ticipation that a new and better order will spontaneously arise once the
structures of the old regime have been dismantled. The ideologue often
taken to represent the nihilist agenda is the nineteenth century Russian
anarchist Serge Nechayev. Contemporary examples of undulated nihilism
are hard to come by, for most of the potential candidates still cling to
some shred of a positive ideology, whether these involve a vague promise
of national liberation or social transformation. Despite such ambigui
ties, some commentators see a rise in the role of nihilist terrorism
over the past 15 years. Robert Kupperman and Darnel Trent, for example,
contrast the political ideals of nineteenth-century radicals with those
they see underlying contemporary terrorism. Commonly offered examples of
the trend to nihilism include the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (or Red Army Fac
tion) , particularly active in Germany during the 1970s, the Japanese
United Red Army, responsible for the death of two dozen victims gunned
down at the Tel Aviv airport in 1972, and

the Abu Nidal Faction among

the Palestinians.12

c.

National Terrorism

A more direct challenge to the state is raised by those dissidents
who successfully appeal to the discontents of a significant segment of
the population under these circumstances, a carefully structured cam
paign of violence, including terrorist tactics, may help to solidify
this potential base of support.
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We often speak too easily of the nation-state,

entertaining the

fiction of a coincidence between the political structure (the state) and
a homogeneous cultural community (the nation). In fact, multi-national
states, like the Soviet Union, India, or Canada, are common. Some multi
state nations, such as the former Germany and Korea, also exist. Even in
those states fortunate enough to possess a widely shared national iden
tity, communally based political organizations still exert a powerful
appeal.
Commonly, particularistic communal ideologies advance the claims of
ethno-cultural groups against the dominant order in the state, although
in some specially nasty conflicts, racial differences reinforce ethnic
and cultural divisions. These dissidents do not advocate simple destruc
tion; rather, they pursue the protection of the integrity and interest
of the groups whom they claim to represent. Typically, they demand
greater autonomy and self-determination, ideas, though vague, which
serve as powerful inducements for political mobilization. Important
examples of communal groups that have resorted to terrorism in the past
decade include:

1) The Basque Separatist Movement: The Basque people,
concentrated in Northwest corner of Spain, have a centuries-old tradi
tion of relative autonomy from Madrid.
2) The Sikh Separatist Movement: The Sikhs are essen
tially a religiously based cultural group concentrated in the Punjab
state in northern India.
3) The Irish Republican Army: one of more resilient po
litical movements of the twentieth century, the IRA has waged an inter
mittent campaign against British rule and Protestant dominance in North
ern Ireland for more than 65 years.
4) The Palestine Liberation Movement: of all the nation
alist or communal groups resorting to violence, the one most readily as
sociated with terrorism are various groups claiming to fight for a Pal
estinian homeland. 13
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These four examples are among the more prominent of the communal
groups indulging in terrorism, others include the Corsican nationalists
who attack representatives of the French central government, and the
Tamir separatists in Sri Lanka, who are demanding their own autonomous
state on the northern part of the island.

d. Revolutionary Terrorism
Finally, dissident groups may advocate a program of social trans
formation that transcends the particularistic concern of any substate
group. The aim is not to secede and alter it. In some cases, the revolu
tionary vision transcends the boundaries

of any one state to encompass

a larger, perhaps global, community. The original Marxist revolutionary
idea certainly possessed such ambitions. The comprehensiveness of ideo
logical principle is a matter of degree, and most contemporary examples
of revolutionary dissent fail considerably short of universal appeal
(communist revolution China and Vietnam largely succeeded because of
their recognition and cooperation of nationalist aspiration).
Perhaps the most potent contemporary case of mixed appeal is that
of Islamic fundamentalism, combining a rejection of the corrupting in
fluence of Western culture with the desire to create a just order based
on the social ethnic embodied in the Koran.14

2. Establishment Terrorism
Coercion is an instrument of power used not only by those who re
bel, but also by those who rule. The definition of "acceptable" coercion
in any stable political community will be based in favor of these who
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use it to defend the established distribution of power and value, usu
ally some limits will be placed who can use it and to what degree it can
be used. Acts of coercion in violation of these limits but intended to
defend from some type of threat or subversion may be termed Established
(or state) Violence.
Establishment terrorism may be a tactic of repression used by both
a regime and by private citizens acting to emulate some perceived threat
to the established order. Somewhat analogous to our preceding effort to
differentiate among dissident groups who use terrorism according to
their ideological coherence, we may distinguish among different forms of
establishment terrorism according to the degree these tactics are inte
grated into the regular operation of the regime; the institutionaliza
tion of terrorist tactics transforms establishment terrorism from a form
of "violence" into "force." 15
a. Vigilante Terrorism
Vigilantism may be defined as a form of establishment violence per
petrated by private citizens (including "off-duty" public officials).
Like other forms of establishment coercion, "vigilantics" are intended
to defend and preserve the established order, not destroy it. The famil
iar forms of vigilantism, displayed throughout American history and
popular in the media, commonly involve private citizens stepping in and
attempting to close the gap of inadequate law enforcement, but often
some members of the establishment may see a threat emerging from groups
who violate no law but who represent a different racial, cultural, or
political identity. Vigilante violence against racial, cultural, or po
litical groups poses perhaps the greatest likelihood of degeneration
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into a type of terrorism. Although "crime control" vigilantism may de
generate into indiscriminate violence against the most unlikely of sus
pects, "social group control" vigilantism starts off by targeting those
who cannot even be loosely described as combatants.16
For an example of this sort, in the rioting that took place after
the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandi in October 1984, over
1,500 Sikhs across India were murdered, and thousand of others were
beaten and their property destroyed.

b. Covert Official Terrorism
Vigilante terrorism consists of private citizens using indiscrimi
nate violence against a perceived threat to the established order; how
ever, the distinction between "private" and "public" is not clear-cut.
People perform both private and public roles, and these are not always
neatly compartmentalized. One of the better known campaigns of covert
official terrorism was that inflicted on Argentina between 1976 and
1979. Many of the details have been revealed through the efforts of the
civilian regime of President Alfonsin, in their efforts to combat a real
threat from left-wing guerrillas, the military rulers unleashed "dirty
war" against a wide range of suspects. During this period at least 7,000
people disappeared, including children and expectant mothers. The war
was conducted by decentralized and secretive military commands in order
to make it difficult to establish clear lines of authority and to make
it difficult to trace the fate of those taken from their homes in the
middle of night.17
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Those who survived reported that their captors disguised their
identities. The military, then, did not deny it was engaged in a major
struggle against enemies of the regime, real or imaged, but the top
leaders denied particular knowledge of the conduct of the campaign and
deliberately obscured their responsibility.

c. Overt Regime Terrorism
Some regimes become sufficiently brazen about their terrorist tac
tics that they embrace them openly as a major enforcement strategy of
their rule. No longer is it a matter of tolerating vigilante terrorism,
the blurring of the boundary between private and public enforcement
roles, or even the deliberate implementation of a covert program of ter
rorism. In all of these cases, at least some recognition survives that
establishment terrorism violates the formal rules and norms defining the
acceptable use of coercion. Consequently, these types of establishment
terrorism can still be arguably labeled as violence. We can find repre
sentative cases of official terrorism of this sort in Stalin, Hitler,
and Pol Pot. Stalin's domination over the Soviet Union from about 1928
to his death in 1953, provides a wide range of regime terrorism. Perhaps
the clearest case of terrorism as official policy is not the campaign
against the peasants who resisted collectivization, but the purge of the
regime itself in the late 1930s. Old Bolsheviks, current party and gov
ernment leaders, regular party members, and military officers all fell
victims to his purge. 10

d. Genocide
The ultimate extension of establishment terrorism carries the in
stitutionalization of this tactic to an extreme conclusion. Whatever we
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might say about the efforts of Stalin to consolidate his power and
eliminate any conceivable challenger, the terrorist policy still had
some limits. Stalin was not intending to liquidate the entire structure
of party and government. With genocide, in contrast, such tacit limits
are absent: A particular group is identified as undesirable for one rea
son or another and then simply eliminated. A policy such as this gener
ally demands the mobilization of considerable energies and organization.
Genocide, admittedly, is a term fraught even more layers of emotion and
ambiguity than the general concept of terrorism.
Ierving Louis Horowitz suggests that a structural characterization
of genocide should include two points:
First, genocide represents a systematic effort over time
to liquidate a national population, usually a minority;
Second. it functions as a fundamental political policy to
Ensure the conformity and participation by the citizenry.1’
The clearest case of twentieth century genocide, in terms of the
coherent identity of the population affected and the institutionalized
nature of the means of destruction, remains the Nazi Holocaust against
the European Jew. The Nazi program came horribly close to achieving com
plete success. The Nazis, then, legalized, rationalized a policy of ter
rorist extermination as a "final solution" to a population they defined
as surplus, subhuman, and expendable.20

F. Roots, Justification, and Source of Terrorism

1. Roots and Justification
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Of our subject matters under consideration, we find their "root" in
the nature and innate character of person.21 * In justifying activities
stemming from these "roots" and/ or in identifying such activities,
being stimulated or influenced by some factors external to minds of men,
some of us put forth what might be regarded as relevant ideological,
religions, educational, moral, and other bases, or find media as an
extremely important factor to be delved into.
More specifically, in the Communist ideology, for Marx the issue
was not whether violence was right or wrong, but rather whether it was
effective or useless "for proletariat revolution in the capitalist
society," according to John Dinse. 22 As a matter of fact, he contin
ues, Marx "often condemns violence, especially terrorist as ineffective"
because it was out of step with historic process. Given the historic
framework of Marx's thought, Marx's basic conclusion on violence is that
it should be truly revolutionary. Violence is not efficacious unless it
takes place in the context developed material conditions. He was une
quivocally

critical of terrorism on the grounds that it was out of step

with the larger, impersonal historic process of revolution.
At the same time, Marx was not opposed to violence in principle. He
foresaw it as a necessary ingredient in the complex evolution of events
culminating in socialist revolution. The mobilization of class conscious

Eric Fromm posit two particular character traits strongly associated
with malignant sadism and necrophilia. Sadism embodies passion to have
absolute and unrestricted control over a living being. Necrophilia gen
erally denote the erotic attention to the dead, decayed, putrid, sickly;
it is the passion to transform that which is alive into something
unalives. Stalin and Hitler may well be ultimate expression, but Fromm
suggests that these traits are shared, though not be same degree. Far
more people possess some capacity for cruel and destructive behavior.
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proletariat under the condition of advanced capitalism probably would
produce an irresistible political force capable of achieving revolution
ary change with a minimum of violence.
In terms of modern day increases in violence, John Cantelon sheds
some meaningful light on its "roots" within the educational and relig
ious perspectives, and the lessons to be learned from the modern day
educational and religious lives that serve to engender or justify such
destructive activities of person. In contradiction to theexpectations
of our liberal heritage, there has been an acceleration in violence in
our modern age. This is contrary to the assumption of continued social
progress; and universal education and enlightened religion were to cause
a decrease in human violence and increase in human cooperation. A compi
lation of the number of

battles fought over the last five centuries is

enough to contradict that hypothesis:
!. 15th century -- 9 battles
2. 16th century -- 87 battles
3. 17th century -- 239 battles
4. 18th century -- 781 battles
5. 19th century -- 651 battles; and
6. 20th century (so far) -- 892 battles 23.

The three major interrelated religions, Judaism, Christianity,
Islam, all coming out of the same cultural background, also share not
only a common fratricidal history which J. Toynbee blamed on their ex
clusiveness claim that each had bad truth

but also common concept of

religion being based upon a covenant.24 In the contemporary scene funda
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mentalist elements arising to ascendancy within the religious groups,
use the primitive covenant motif to justify their particular forms of
violence.
Furthermore, John Cantelon goes on delve into the attitudes and re
sponses of the so-called moral majority of any given society towards the
terrorist activities in recent years. 25 To the extent, in addition to
general ideological, religious, educational, moral and other factors
serving as roots

of terrorism, the

"three key components are

contained within the left terrorist ideology," according to John Dinse:
First is the assessment of conditions confronting the group or movement,
with emphasis upon the relative strength and weakness of the revolution
ary forces vis-S-vis the ruling class.
Secondly, tactics follow from the previous assessment. This dimen
sion focuses on the organization and action needed in order to bring
about a revolutionary cataclysm. Finally, although often undeveloped,
there is usually some sort of post revolutionary vision or program which
projects outlines of a future "just" society. Inevitably, the strategy
as a whole stresses capturing or destroying the governmental power and
economical control of the bourgeoisie with the primary use of abolishing
existing structure of social privilege.26
2. Contemporary Sources of Terrorism
There will be no shortage of potential
population; increased poverty and

causes for terrorism: rising

scarcity of resources; racial tension;

inflation and unemployment; increased tension between the "haves" and
"have nots"; waves of refugees shoved about

by war and repression; immi

grants moving from poor states to wealthier

ones, often bringing with
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them the conflicts of their home countries, sometimes causing resentment
among native citizens; rapid urbanization; the disintegration of tradi
tional authority structures; the emergence of single issue groups; the
rise of aggressive fundamentalist religious groups or religious cult.
Yet there is no demonstrable connection between poverty, scarcity, in
flation or any other socioeconomic indicators and terrorism. Indeed,
countries experiencing the highest level of terrorism are often among
the economically and socially most advanced nations in their
regions or in the world, and often the least authoritarian. 27
Contemporary terrorism seems to come with modern society. Tradi
tional authority structures have collapsed with ensuing violence
throughout the history and the present time is no exception.
Ideology and ethnic nationalism have been two major engines of mod
ern terrorism, ideology drove the urban guerrillas in Latin America and
their terrorist imitators in Western Europe and the USA.

Most of these

groups adhered to some variation of Marxism. Dreams of independent home
lands have inspired groups from the IRA to Armenians, and more recently
religious fanaticism, although directed toward secular ends, and secret
wars waged by states have accounted for growing share of the world's
terrorist violence. 28

3. Media
All the forgoing factors

notwithstanding, "terrorism" and

"political violence" are further influenced by media. One of the most
noticeable developments in recent years has been the increasingly skill
ful use of publicity by terrorist organizations. The media are of para
mount importance in their

campaigns;

the terrorist act by itself is

next to nothing, whereas publicity is all. The real danger of facing the
terrorist is that of being ignored, receiving insufficient publicity,
losing the image of the desperate freedom fighter. But the media, con
stantly in need of diversity and new angles, make fickle friends. Ter
rorists will always have to innovate. They are, in some respects, the
superentertainers. With the growth of inexpensive video equipment,
these groups are very often able to provide news organizations with
television -- ready footage: messages from terrorist leaders, interviews
with captives, and even visual records of execution. The PLO owns a
share in an Arab communication satellite. The western media is vulner
able to misuse by international terrorists; the fact that terrorism by
definition tends to be dramatic and pictorial through the terrorist acts
which take place, make the media vulnerable.
Again, it is not the magnitude of the terrorist operation that
counts but to whole campaigns. The media have always magnified terrorist
exploits quite irrespective of their intrinsic importance. Groups num
bering perhaps a dozen members have been described as armies, their of
ficial communiques have been discussed in countless television shows,
radio broadcasts, articles and editorials. Even an apparently illogical
or senseless attack becomes more effective if given wide coverage in the
media than an operation against a seemingly obvious target'that is ig
nored. These strategies work only in societies that have no censor-
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CHAPTER

III

The New International Environment
and Its Source of Terrorism

The characteristics of the current terrorism have been deeplyrooted in the new environment after Cold-War period. Therefore, it re
quires us to look into the ingredients in the current situation which is
fomenting a new trend of international terrorism.
For forty five years, from World War II's finish to the end of the
Cold War, most agree that the greatest threat to global security was an
all-out war between the two superpowers that could perhaps culminate in
the use of nuclear weapons. In fear of this, government officials and
concerned citizens sought to diminish the risk of nuclear conflict
through intensive diplomacy, improved crisis management, arms control,
and cultural and other exchanges. Because of these efforts and the re
forms that former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev set in motion in
1985, the risk of a superpower conflict has largely vanished, and the
world no longer dreads a nuclear conflagration.
The post Cold War era, however, is by no means free of the threat
of armed conflict, as demonstrated by continuing warfare in areas as di
verse as Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Indonesia, Liberia, Peru, Somalia,
Sri Lanka, the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and the for
mer Yugoslavia. While those conflicts do not have the potential to erupt
into a nuclear holocaust, they do pose a threat of wide soared regional
fighting with fearsome death tolls and destruction. Moreover, as weapons
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of mass destruction become more widely diffused, A growing number of
those original wars will entail a risk of chemical and even nuclear at
tack. Preventing, controlling, and resolving these conflicts, and imped
ing the spread of advanced weaponry will, therefore, constitute the
principal world security tasks of the 1990s and beyond.

A. The Shifting political Landscape
A metaphor popular among analysists thinking about the current
reshaping of the world is that of "tectonic motion," or the movement of
the giant "plates" that make up the earth's rocky crust. Because this
movement can shape continents and alter climates through earthquakes and
volcanoes it produces, tectonic motion serves as an apt analogy for the
end of the Cold War and other dramatic changes now occurring throughout
the world. 1
The geographical metaphor conveys the scale of the changes now un
der way around the globe and illustrates how surface events are the
product of deeper sociohistorical forces. Thus, we sense that the drive
for democracy and human rights in Russia and Eastern Europe is related
to similar pressure in Burma, Chile, China, Haiti, Mexico, the Philip
pines, and Thailand. The image of tectonic motion also suggests the
havoc wreaked by the break up of large empires and federations (notably
the Soviet Empire and Yugoslavia) and the fracturing of established al
liances such as the Warsaw Pact and, to a lesser

degree, NATO.2

But to adequately describe the security environment of this era af
ter the Cold War, the tectonics metaphor must be supplemented by an ad
ditional image -- one that captures the profusion of ethnic, tribal, re
ligious, and national conflicts that we are witnessing today. Imagine a

38

piece of glass laid over a map of the world and then struck by a large,
heavy weight. The result would be an intricate web of cracks across the
world, with heavy concentration in some areas but none left entirely un
scathed.
These cracks represent the many fissures in our multiethnic, multi
class, and multilingual society - the divisions between rich and poor,
black and white, Hindu and Muslim, Muslim and Jew, Czech and Slovak,
Serve and Groat, Azeri and Armenian, and so on. The fissures are
stressed by the tectonic shifts occurring beneath the surface,

but it

is along their jugged lines that the battles of the post Cold War era
are being fought.
The fractured-glass

analogy suggests that multiplicity of con-

flictual relationship in the world. Consider for a moment the situation
in the middle East, which is not just a conflict between the Arab states
and Israel, or between Iran and Iraq, but rather a far more elaborate
configuration of animosities. In Lebanon, for instance, it involves Marinite Christians, Sunni and Shiite Muslim, the Druse, and Palestinians;
In Syria, the Alawites and other Muslims; and in Iraq, Kurds, Sunnis,
and Shiite.

A similar diversity in the conflictual pattern is found in

the former Yugoslavia, and in the Caucasus region of what was once the
Soviet Union.
Each of these images - tectonic motion and fractured glaBS - is
helpful in identifying features of the current World security environ
ment. However, to best describe this environment it is useful to combine
the images; for tectonic movement it is useful to combine the images;
tectonic movements causing massive shifts beneath the surface that in
turn accentuate and extend the cracks appearing on the surface. By as-
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sessing both the tectonic movements and networks of cracks, we can ar
rive at a comprehensive picture of current world issues. 3

B. Forces that Destabilize the World Security
It is risky, of course, to attempt an analysis while the world is
still undergoing transformation. But enough has already occurred on the
surface for us to be able to begin to understand what is happening be
low: Six tectonic shifts in particular are worthy of discussion:

1. The Pull of Economic Forces
There was a time, not so long ago, when the "fate of nations" was
determined largely by political and military factors; most signifi
cantly, ability of the state to marshall a country's resources for war,
conquest or defense. Today the state remains a major international ac
tor, but its capacity to organize resources for its purposes has been
circumscribed by what has been called 'supranational capitalism.' As the
economist Robert Heilbroner sees it, the global nexus of multinational
corporations and international financial institution has accumulated
vast power and influence at the expense of national capitalism and state
agencies. This, Hilbroner notes, endows supranational capitalism with
the ability "to rearrange the global division and distribution of po
litical and economic power" - - a capacity that, when exercised, is often
"seismic" in its impact. 1
Obviously it is impossible to establish a one-to-one corporation
between broad economic phenomena and specific world events. But the
failure of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites to keep
pace with economic growth in the West contributed to the debilitation of
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the Communist Regime is certain. Unable to generate funds for investment
in economic and social revitalization, these regimes stagnated and lost
what remained of their political legitimacy. The eventual result was a
rapid slide from power, with what had become a corrupt and demoralized
ruling class putting up little resistance.
The same economic forces are now exacerbating intergroup conflicts
around the globe. The dissolution of Yugoslavia can be partially attrib
uted to the desire of the country's stronger units, Crotia and Slovenia,
to break away from their less advantaged fellow republics and to inte
grate more closely with the Western European economy. Similarly, the
breakup of Czechoslovakia can be explained in part by growing resentment
in Slovakia over the faster pace of economic activities in the Czech Re
public.
Perhaps even more destabilizing is the widening economic gap be
tween the industrialized 'North' and underdeveloped 'South'. Most of
less developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have seen
the difference between their standard of living and that of the wealth
ier nations widen over the past decade. At the same time, the global
spread of western culture and consumption pattern via the mass media
have inculcated an appetite for goods and services not attainable by
masses of the poor and unemployed. The result is increased North-South
tensions ranging from the growing militancy of political and religious
movements with anti-Western theme (movements, for example, like Maoist
Shining Path in Peru and the

Islamic Jihad in Egypt) to more South-to-

North drug smuggling. Depressed economies in the South are also behind
the rise in migration to the nations the North itself a growing cause of
violence in the countries. 5
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2. The Global Diffusion of Power
The rise of supranational capitalism has been accompanied by a dif
fusion of political, military, and economic power away from the United
States and the Soviet Union, the two main poles of the Cold war era, to
other actors in the international order. This has been in progress since
the 1950s and 1960s, When the Western European countries and Japan

be

gun to recover from the devastating effects of World War II and many
Third World countries secured their independence; It gained further mo
mentum in the 1970s and 1980s with the slowdown of economic growth in
the United States and the Soviet Union and the acquisition of major
military capabilities by emerging Third World powers. The process culmi
nated in 1989-1991 with the collapse of

the Soviet Union, the dissolu

tion of the Warsaw Pact, and the resulting disappearance of the bipolar
world.6
As of yet, no clearly defined system of power relationships has
developed in the place of the bipolar system and the tight alliances of
the Cold War period. Rather a number of regional power centers - Japan
in Asia, Germany in Europe, Russia in central Eurasia, the United States
in North America - have emerged, each surrounded by a cluster of associ
ated states. These centers cooperate with each other in some matters and
compete in others; states not aligned with any of the principal clusters
manage as best they can.
The diffusion of political and military power and the realignment
of global power relationships have multiple implications for world secu
rity. With the erosion of superpower influence and the proliferation of
modern weapons, newly strengthened regional powers see an opportunity to
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pursue their hegemonic ambitions, often provoking fierce conflict in the
process (as in the case of Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran and its 1990 in
vasion of Kuwait). Furthermore, the collapse of control over the periph
ery of what was the Soviet Union has resulted in a series of ethnic and
territorial classes between components of the empire. And worldwide dif
fusion of nonnuclear weapons has contributed to the duration and inten
sity of insurgence and civil and ethnic conflicts. 7

3. Increased Popular Assertiveness at the Grass Roots Level

Paralleling the growth of globalized economic institution and the
diffusion of political power among international players is the in
creased assertion at the local and national level of people power.
Wherever we look in the world today, we find grass-roots citizens move
ments striving for fundamental change in key social, economic, and

po

litical structures. In China, Haiti, eastern Europe, and the former So
viet Union, this assertiveness has entailed a drive for democratic
rights; it has also, however, appeared as anti-foreigner sentiment in
Germany and increased anti-Semetism in Russia.
By far the most potent manifestation of this grass-roots assertive
ness is the militant expression of ethnic, national linguistic, and re
ligious affiliation by peoples who have previously lived peacefully in
multinational, multicultural societies. This expression takes many forms
such as the calls for secession by the constituent nationalities of the
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; militant assertion of Hindu funda
mentalism in India and Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt; the Kurdish re
bellion in Iraq and the Tamil rebellion in Sri Lanka; and Palestinian
intifada. As suggested by Myron Weiner of the Massachusetts Institute of
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Technology,

"Peoples"—

however they identify themselves by race, relig

ion, language, tribe, or shared history— want new political institu
tions or new relationships within existing institutions; when accomm odation is not forthcoming, they are likely to escalate their demands. 8
The growing assertion of populist claims, whether of a political or
an ethnic nature, has significant implications for world security.

At

the very least it is jeopardizing the ability of current leaders from
North and South, East and West, to hold on to power. In many areas it
has led to violent clashes between members of opposing groups. And in
Yugoslavia it has created a maelstrom of ethnic fury that threatens to
engulf much of southeastern Europe.

4. Diminishing power and Authority of Nation-State
Caught between ever more powerful supranational capitalism on one
side and restive population on the other is the modern nation-state. Al
though still among the actors with most clout on the international
stage, the state is steadily losing ground to international financial
institutions and well-organized ethic and religious constituencies. This
is evident both in the ability of the International Monetary Fund to
dictate government spending practices in many Third World and eastern
European countries, and in that of Muslim clerics to affect foreign pol
icy in Iran and Saudi Arabia.
To a great extent, the decline in the power of the nation-state is
a product of a global revolution of rising expectations at a time of in
creased international economic competition. People still count on their
state to play the game of wealth effectively and thus attain or protect
high standards of living.

But state authorities have less control over
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their economies than before, and when they fail to satisfy popular ex
pectations invite popular revolt - - through electoral channels where
that option exists, through rioting

and civil strife where it does

not. 9
The replacement of older, unrepresentative regimes by new, popular
ity backed governments in the Soviet bloc and elsewhere has not, unfor
tunately, always resulted in greater social stability. In many cases new
regimes have played the game of wealth with even less success than their
predecessors, resulting in widespread
and mob action.

discontent and a risk of coups

To retain their hold on power, some of these regimes —

notably those in Serbia —

have turned to ultranationalism as a solu

tion, thereby provoking fresh outbreaks of ethnic violence.

In other

cases, there has been a ceding of authority to local warlords and secre
tarial forces; in extreme cases, the state has simply withered away,
giving free rein to the sort of gang warfare seen in Liberia and Soma
lia.

5. The Rise of the "Weapon" State with New Capabilities
Adding to dangers posed by all the factors described above is the
global proliferation of modern weapons and the technologies for produc
ing them.
Such proliferation entails not only the spread of nuclear, chemi
cal, and biological weapons -- the so-called weapon of mass destruction
but also a wide range of "conventional" arms (tanks, planes, guns, and
missiles used by regular military forces). Both sorts of weapons are
finding their way into arsenals of more and more nations, thereby stimu
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lating local arms races and ensuring that future wars will be fought everascending lethality and destructiveness. 10
In the nuclear realm, the five declared nuclear weapons powers
(United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China) have been
joined by three undeclared nucleared ones (Israel, India, and Pakistan).
While Iran, Iraq, and North Korea continue their efforts to develop such
weapon, and Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan re
tain a capacity to do so in the future (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukrane
inherited some nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, but have
pledged to turn them over to Russian authorities. Still, many analysts
worry about the possible spread of former Soviet nuclear materials and
technology).
As for chemical weapons, American intelligence officials have iden
tified 14 Third World countries believed to possess an offensive chemi
cal warfare capability: Burma, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam.11
Many of these nations have also engaged in research on biological weap
ons, and have acquired ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver
nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads.

We have already witnessed

the extensive use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, and in
Iraq's subsequent campaign to liquidate Kurdish villages in strategic
border areas. Iraq also threatened chemical attacks against Israel in
1990 and 1991, and Israel officials responded with threat of possible
nuclear retaliation. Central Intelligence Agency officials have reported
that India and Pakistan were

prepared to use nuclear weapons in 1990,

when it was feared that the fighting in Kashmir would spark a full-scale
conflict. 12
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The proliferation of advanced conventional arms has proceeded at a
pace with that of weapons of mass destruction.

According to estimates

by the Congressional Research Service, Third World countries spent
$339.5 billion on imported weapons from 1983 to 1990 (in constant 1990
US dollars) -- which translates into some 13,010 tanks and selfpropelled guns, 27,430 pieces of heavy artillery, 2,920 supersonic com
bat planes, 38,430 surface to air missiles, and 53,790 surface-tosurface missiles.

These weapons sustained the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-

1988 and other regional conflicts, and swelled the arsenals of emerging
powers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 13
Security analysts are also

worried about the growing diffusion of

advanced conventional weapons. As military spending in NATO and the for
mer Warsaw pact fails, arms manufactures in these countries, whether
state-owned or private, are increasingly disposed to export their prod
ucts to the Third World, where the demand for modern weapons is high and
likelihood of their being used in combat is growing.

The stockpiles

built up by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies during the Cold
War era constitute a vast reservoir of surplus arms that are increas
ingly finding their way into the black market —

and thus, into the

hands of terrorists, guerrillas, separatist forces, and other irregular
formations that threaten the peace in many areas of the world.
Chemical and biological weapons add several complications to al
ready difficult regional conflicts.
First, their potential use can add to heightened tensions before
war occurs, panicking the populations and making the decision to war
more likely.

Second, destroying these weapons before they are used

would be a high priority target. Third, the use of such weapons can only
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increase the desperation of the participants as well as the motivation
for revenge in the target population, thereby making it more difficult
to end a war already begun.

The fourth problem is that, if chemical

possession is perceived as desirable or necessary, the proliferation of
such weapons may be more difficult to control than even nuclear
weapons.
The key to nuclear nonproliferation has been the denial of access
to fuel grade plutonium.

However, the basic ingredients from which

chemical weapons are produced are commonly available; monitoring and
controlling the situation is difficult.
Our recent experience with chemical weapons is limited to two
cases, both involving Iraq. In the later stage of the 1980-88 war with
Iran, Iraq used chemicals against Iranian troops as well as its own
Kurdish minority.
Iranian cities.

It also engaged in terrorist missile attack against
Experts disagree about how effective the chemical weap

ons were in these situations, but they agree that the Iranian-Iraq war
proved that ability to employ such weapons. 14
Proliferation of arms of all types is certain to figure as a pri
mary security concern in the 1990s and beyond because it helps increase
the number, length, and duration of conventional conflicts and also in
creases the risk that future wars will involve the use of weapons of
mass destruction, whether deliberate or accidental.

6. Population Growth Environmental Decline
The erosion of the state's power and authority has been acceler
ated, in many instances, by a sixth tectonic force: rapid population
growth is not by itself a cause of instability - historically, it has
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often contributed to the health and vigor of societies, as in the case
of the United States.

But when population increases exceed

the rate of

economic growth (as in many Third World countries today), and when they
contribute to the depletion of valuable resources (such as tropical for
ests and tillable soil), the ability of states to engage in long-term
economic and social development is impaired - thus

ensuring worse hard

ship and unrest in future.
The world population now stands at about 5.5 billion people, and
this figure is expected to double by the middle of the twenty first cen
tury. 15 Such a jump could theoretically be sustained if the planet's
products were developed to replace those natural substances being de
pleted.

But resources are not evenly distributed, and new products

might not be available at an affordable price to all who need them.

As

things stand now, many states in Asia, Africa, and in Latin America are
not able to provide for burgeoning number of young people, and will be
even less able to do in the future. The consequences include a rising
incidence of hunger and malnutrition, increased migration from the im
poverished countryside to the urban shantytown, soaring unemployment
(especially among youth),and the growing appeal of extremist move
ments .16
Even if population growth is stabilized, the world must still con
tend with the problem arising from human-induced degradation of the en
vironment.

Much has been written about the long-term effects of global

warming and depletion of the atmosphere's ozone layer, and on their im
plications for human, plants, and animal population; much less, however,
is known about the impact of environmental decline on intergroup and in
terstate relation.

Preliminary research suggests that environmental de
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cline, especially when it occurs in environmentally stressed areas of
the Third World (deserts, rainforests, hillsides, coastal lowlands) will
exacerbate intergroup competition and conflict and drive yet more people
into crowded urban shantytowns where the prospects for meaningful em
ployment are dim and the danger of unrest is high. 17
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CHAPTER

IV

CHARACTERISTICS OF POST COLD WAR
TERRORISM

A. Terrorist Sponsorship and Instruments of Foreign Policy

1. The Implication of International Terrorism
United States Secretary of Defense, W. Weinberger in remarks made
in 1986 to the American Bar Association National Conference on terrorism
stated:
The face of international terrorism is constantly changing
as it increases ... The number of terrorist groups has mul
tiplied.
We have also seen the advent or at least resurgence, of sui
cidal terrorist and fanatical, pseudo-religious doctrines
that extol terrorism. Terrorists have developed collaboratetive networks. They have gained better access to internatio
nal arms market and have acquired more sophisticated weapons
and explosives...Terrorists have refined their planning, in
telligence and targeting methods, often surveying their
victims for months...Terrorists have discovered new source
of funding through crime. In addition to their traditional
bank robberies, they have entered the lucrative narcotics
trade. Terrorists have become skilled managers of their
financial assets using secretive banking channels and inves
ting large sums in legitimate business in the United States
and elsewhere. Finally, we are confronted with the spread
of state-sponsored terrorism...
These comments do reflect an evolution in the understanding of in
ternational terrorism, suggesting a deeper understanding of terrorists
that goes beyond the traditional and outdated perspective of terrorism
as an act performed only by madmen.1
The term international terrorism covers a number of different issues in
the contemporary world, from state sponsored terrorism against foreign
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countries to cooperation between various terrorist groups.

It also fre

quently refers to attacks against foreign nationals or property in the
terrorists' own country or anywhere else.
have been conspiratorial ties between

None of this is new: there

revolutionary (and counter revo

lutionary) groups in Europe since the early part of the nineteenth cen
tury.

A British committee of investigation into terrorism in India

noted that, together with the emphasis on religious motives, Bengali
terrorist propaganda dwelt heavily upon the Russian rules

of

revolutionary violence. 2
Terrorism that qualifies as international or transnational involves
actions in which the nationality of the victims is different from that
of the perpetrators, or the operation is extraterritorial, located out
side the boundaries of a contested area.

The US State Department de

fines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpe
trated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." To be interna
tional, it must involve the citizens

or territory of more than one

country. 3
Such terrorism strongly reflects the interdependence of the inter
national system. It would not be possible if nations were not linked in
complex networks of mutual political and economical interest. Were
there no tourists, no diplomats and no business travelers, terrorism
could not have assumed the form it has.

International terrorism has

been characterized most notably by attacks on diplomats or diplomatic
facilities, on civil aviation (aircraft and airports) and on foreign
businessmen, journalists and educators.

Its second important character
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istic is the seizure of hostages in order to bargain with their govern
ments or with the host government where the kidnapping or barricade oc
curs.

Terrorism has become a modern form of coercive bargaining, in

which the terrorists have the initiative.

Their demands usually include

the release of prisoners, the payment of a monetary ransom, or the pub
lication of a communication.

2. Support Mechanism in International Terrorism
There are seven essential prerequisites for mounting terrorism.
There must be some main aim or motivation among the perpetrators, even
if it ultimately amounts to little more than an intense hatred of their
perceived enemies or a desire for violent revenge against some alleged
insjustice.

There must be leaders to instigate and direct the struggle.

In any sustained and significant campaign, there will also need to be
some degree of organization, some training in the special skill of ter
rorism, and cash that helps to buy weapons and ammunitions and other es
sential needs. Finally, it is clearly vital for the terrorists that they
should have access to the target country and precise targets selected
within that country.
Exactly the same basic ingredients are required to mount a viable
campaign of international terrorism.

But they will require signifi

cantly greater level of organization, training expertise, cash and means
of access to foreign states, to wage a full international campaign.
us identify some of the major types of support mechanisms involved in
contemporary international terrorism:
a. Cells of predominantly indigenous Terrorist
Organizations

Let
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Very few cases exist of purely indigenous movements.

Terrorism

tends to have inherent tendencies toward internationalization.

But by

no means do all groups operate outside their borders or resort to hi
jacking airliners or attacking foreign diplomats.

The Basque ETA and

the IRA, for example, generally confine their actions to the domestic
arena of conflict (which for the IRA includes Great Britain and the Re
public of Ireland).
So, too, to do Tamil separatists in Srilanka.
terests of such groups shift, so do their targets.

However, as the in
ETA, for example,

has begun to attack French targets because of French decision to extra
dite ETA members to Spain.

Sikh separatists and Armenian terrorists

have local aims but act on the international scene. International ter
rorism represents a type of strategy, not a type of terrorism,
b. Cells of Terrorist Groups in Exile
These groups are utterly dependent on their international support
base because they have been forced by political circumstances or neces
sity to operate entirely abroad.

Well-known examples are the Armenian

terrorist groups, such as the Armenian Secret Army for the liberation of
Armenia (ASALA), and the Croatians scattered in many Western countries.
These groups can draw on invaluable local bases of support among sympa
thizers in the emigrant population of major western cities.

These pro

vide sanctuary, fundraising sources of weapon and esqplosives: on the
other hand, they are generally desperately conscious of their weakness
in political and military terms, and find it impossible to gain state
sponsorship.

Few states wish to back a loser.

They are potentially

vulnerable to police and political reaction by their hosts in the states
to which they have immigrated.

They can be easily identified, and they
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risk a backlash against their small countries if they make trouble
abroad.
All terrorist groups are prone to schism and splits, sometimes over
matters of fundamentalism and program but more often on questions of
leadership, organization and tactics.
nerable

Exile groups are especially vul

to this type of organizational fragmentation.

Many exiled ter

rorist movements have been paralyzed, or rendered virtually ineffective,
by internecine conflict.

For example, the Palestinian movement in exile

suffers from a bitter split between the

pro-Arafat and anti-Arafat fac

tions, frequently spilling over into assassination and revenge killings
of Palestinian leaders abroad.
c. Mixed indigenous and Multinational groups and Alliances
The mixing of indigenous and international terrorist support bases
can be easily illustrated in relation to the Shi'ite fundamentalist
revolutionaries.

In Iran, in Lebanon, and the other major centers of

Shiite population there is a constant emphasis on achieving dominance of
their religious ideas in their own societies.

Yet simultaneously, and

interdependent with these efforts, the Shiite movements, such as the
Islamic Jihad, are also consciously engaged in wider "holy war" to ex
port Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas and practice to the whole of the Muslim
world.

For this wider purpose, the Shiite militants can call an impres

sive support base in Iran in the form of religious ideas and propaganda,
religious leadership, a fair degree of

centralized coordination and or

ganization, cash weapon, and Iran's diplomatic and spying network.
Another interesting variant of the "mixed" support base is the
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comparatively new alliance of extreme left terrorist groups in Western
Europe against NATO and defense-related targets.

It is clear that all

the groups involved «— Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany, Action
Directe (AD) in France, and the Fighting Communist Cells in Belgium —
on the one hand continue to wage their own private war against govern
ments, law-enforcement systems and other key institutions in their re
spective states.

Hence, the hunger-strike campaign of the RAF in early

1985, was aiming, without success, to intimidate the authorities into
relocating all RAF prisoners in the same goal.
Yet on the other hand, those who study the evidence surely cannot
doubt that a genuinely new, if loosely coordinated, international alli
ance of these groups is attempting to mount a West European campaign
against NATO.
d. Indirect State Sponsorship, via Surrogate and Client
Groups
Indirect state sponsorship occurs when a government decides to aid
a particular movement or group on the ground that it will serve the
strategic and political interest of the sponsor.

It is generally

adopted as a policy for one or more of the following purpose:

to re

dress an international grievance, to export revolution, to hunt down and
eradicate exiled dissidents or to intimidate them into silence, to
weaken an adversary state, and a auxiliary weapon in a wider war of in
tervention or international war.
In the course of the Arab-Israel conflict on the issue of the Pal
estinians, many states have intervened by giving indirect sponsorship
and help to factions of the PLO.

The major funds of the PLO groupings

are derived from the contribution of the rich Arab oil Btates, and there
is abundant evidence of the very substantial military support given to
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A1 Fatah and other main PLO formations since the mid 1970s.

The Soviets

were happy to use Yassir Arafat and his movement as a stalking horse to
try quietly to expand Russian influence in the Middle East.
captured in the 1982 war in Lebanon confirm also the

Documents

substantial Soviet

and Eastern European stake in training PLO members.
Normally it is exceedingly difficult to establish beyond doubt the
identity of a state sponsor indirectly implicated in this type of inter
national terrorist attack.

A major aim of a state sponsor is to remain

covert, at the very least to be able plausibly to deny any involvement.
It is should be also

that sponsorship takes an any forms.

Help and en

couragement, even the provision of false documents and weapons does not
necessarily mean that state sponsor has total control over the choice of
target and method of attack.

Many of the militants and experienced Pal

estinian groups, for example, are quite capable of running such opera
tions autonomously, providing their own logistics, if need arises.

A

further complication is that some of these groups have a number of state
sponsors helping them simultaneously in various ways.

Consequently,

they are able to establish safe havens and operational bases in several
different countries.

A logical consequence of this complex form of al

liance with multilateral indirect state sponsorship is that even if co
ercion or pressure succeeds in

one state sponsor to disengage from sup

port the terrorist group itself will still be able to continue its ac
tivities using other resources. Hence, even if one state sponsor fears
reprisal and does try to rein them in, it may not succeed,
e.

Direct State Sponsorship

Some state sponsors have tried to avoid the uncertainty and prob
lems of indirect sponsorship by resorting to direct state controlled in
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ternational terrorism, using their own hit-squads to assassinate oppo
nents, disrupt, or undermine adversaries.

The Libyan and Iranian re

gimes blatantly flout international norms and laws by such behavior.
For example, Colonel Gadafi openly boasts of his intention to

murder

President Mubarak and Western leaders and his plan to hunt down and mur
der his exiled opponents, whom he describes as

the stray dogs.

In

1985 alone there were seven major incidents involving actual or abortive
attacks by Gaddafi hit-squads on opponents of the regime abroad, includ
ing murderers committed in Rome, Nicosia, and Bonn.
It should be noted that although diplomatic cover and facilities
have frequently been

used in recent years for direct state sponsored

terrorism, especially by Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran, there are many
other ways in which such attacks can be mounted.

The assassination

squad used by the secret services of terrorist states may be sent on
their missions under many different types of cover as students, business
men even, simply tourists.

In the open and easily accessible West hid

den assassins are most impossible to identify and apprehend. 4

3. Terrorist Sponsorship and Instrument of Foreign Policye
With the Cold War over, the breakdown of the bi-polar system and
accompanying diffusion of politic power has brought substantial change
in terrorist network and sponsorship.
An interpretation that gained popularity in the United States dur
ing the 1980s holds that terrorism primarily reflects conflict between
the United States and the former Soviet Union or World communism. 5
The proponents of this view argue that ideological affinity motivates
radical non-state organizations to act as the pliant accomplices of en
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emy states, including Iran, and Libya as well as the then Soviet Union.
To this school of thought, terrorist organizations and their government
supports are linked

to

a global network, so that all incidents of ter

rorism, however disparate, are actually a manifestation of the same ma
licious intent. Terrorism is perceived as a potent yet widely ignorant
threat to the internal stability and foreign interest of Western democ
racies .
This Cold War view finds that terrorism has become an attractive
strategy for the actors in international politics, preferable to conven
tional or nuclear warfare, which has become too risky and too expensive,
and that its uses by hostile states give terrorism the potential to al
ter the international balance of power.

This position leads to advocacy

of a tougher response to terrorism and accusation that the leaders of
Western democracies are blind to the threat, lacking in resolve, con
fused, weak and vacillating.

Its implication is that terrorism is the

problem caused by states, not by dissident undergrounds with agendas of
their own.

Terrorist organizations are denied any autonomy.

The threat

of terrorism is thus elevated to a position of high significance for na
tional security.
However, in reality there is no monolithic terrorist entity.
stead terrorism appears highly elective and pluralistic.

In

In 1985, over

sixty different organizations were noted as engaged in international
terrorism. Fifty were counted in 1986 and fifty-six in 1987. 6
Major perpetrators of the acts of international terrorism account
for roughly half of all incidents, which shows that the distribution of
responsibility for terrorism is broad.

The highest ranking group, the

Islamic Jihad, accounted for 8.7 percent of all incidents in 1985.

In
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1986 the MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) in Peru led with 6.6
percent followed by the Colombian ELN (National Liberation Army) and the
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions, each with 8.2 percent.

In gen

eral, Middle Eastern terrorism, whether Palestinian or Lebanese, ac
counts for over half all international terrorist incidents, which in
1985 spilled over into Western Europe.

In 1985, eighty-four countries

were victimized by international terrorism; in 1986, the number was
seventy-eight.
The alliance among these organizations is tenuous.

A recent study

of international terrorism concludes that coalition among groups is in
frequent, ad hoc and short in duration. 7
The commonality of interest among terrorist organizations does not
seem sufficient to sustain long-term operational cooperation, although
the fact of transient linkage is undeniable.

In 1987, the "Anti-

Imperialist International Brigade," thought to be an alliance of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian and the Japanese Red
Army, carried out four relatively amateurish attacks against Western
targets, including the Venice summit meeting.

In 1972,however, their

cooperation produced deadly results when an attack on an arriving Air
France flight at Israel's Lod airport left 28 dead and 76 wounded.
An important reason for the conclusion that terrorism threatens in
ternational security is the charge of state sponsorship. Many observers
think that terrorism is likely to become a form of surrogate warfare,
employed equally by nonstates and by states too weak to mount a conven
tional military challenge.

In 1985, the US Department of State consid

ered 12 percent of international terrorist incidents to be state sup
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ported, the majority by Middle Eastern governments.

State-support was

thought to be linked to the increasing destructiveness of terrorism,
which in 1984 killed 20 percent more people than the average of the pre
ceding four years.

The British strategic theorist Lawrence Freedman

agrees that state sponsorship challenges international security, but
warns that the need to justify policies of military retaliation is
likely to lead to an exaggeration of this threat. 8
The precise relationship between states and the terrorist under
ground is difficult to determine.

Some states have provided financial

and logistical support that has made international terrorism possible,
but whether the dependency relationship thus created entails state con
trol over the actions of such groups is hard to know.

Iran seems to in

fluence but not determine the fate of foreign hostages held by Hezbollah
in Lebanon.
Linkage between states and undergrounds are not uncommon, although
they only came to the attention of Western governments in the 1980s.
Since 1967, Arab states have maintained affiliation with various Palestinian-groups, the Fatah Revolutionary Council.

Reliance on proxies

seems to be favored over the direct use of government agents, but both
practices are familiar in the Middle East.
These international conspiracy theories have no convincing evidence
for a unified terrorist network,

but a "Cold War" international situa

tion provided circumstantial evidence

that the bloc used terrorist

sponsorship as an instrument of foreign policy.
Official former Soviet spokesmen have always condemned terrorism,
denouncing it as adventurist, elitist and objectively serving the inter
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ests.

Yet, at the same time, the Soviet Union has provided arms, finan

cial aid, military training and, on occasion, political support to vari
ous terrorist groups.

In practice, as distinctive from doctrine, Soviet

Russia has given selective support to "national liberation movements"
employing terrorist means.

It has also assisted some groups, which even

by stretching a vivid imagination,cannot be classified as belonging to
the "national liberation" camp.

Furthermore, it had closely cooperated

with the countries that had been main sponsors of international terror
ism, Libya and Syria.

In the overall Soviet strategy of increasing its

influence in the Third World and weakening the NATO allies, terrorist
activities play a certain, albeit

minor role.

The difficulty as seen

from Moscow is that support for terrorism is a fine art, that it is ef
fective only in certain conditions, and that, like certain medicine, it
may have unpleasant side effects.
If the Western government has charged the Soviet bloc with much of
the responsibility for international terrorism, the Soviet Union and its
allies have argued that Western governments, and above all the United
States, have been the main inspirers of terrorism.

Instances of Western

involvement in various Third World insurgencies can be found without
difficulty.

The United States supported the "Contra" in Nicaragua and

Angola, Israel has kept a militia in South Lebanon, the French inter
vened in Chad, the Britain (indirectly) in some of the minor Persian
Gulf Principalities —

not to mention the massive help given to the Af

ghan revels by American via Pakistan.
The difference between Western and Soviet as well as Libyan, Syr
ian, and Iranian involvement was both quantitative and qualitative in
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character.

The Western countries are Status Quo oriented. They want to

prevent insurgency and other forms of destabilization and, from a purely
technical point of view, they are all ill-equipped to deal with such
contingencies.

The Russians and their allies had not only greater expe

rience and competence in this field, they do not have to render accounts
to their parliaments, and their media do not report the support given to
terrorist allies.

While Russia had its proxies such as Cuba or Bul

garia, America had no such substitutes. If, despite these handicaps, a
terrorist plot is nevertheless hatched from time to time in the West, it
is usually bungled, causing a major scandal and the downfall of those
who ordered it.

The French operation against the Rainbow Warrior ship

in New Zealand was a perfect example.

Moral and political inhibition

quite apart, the question of Western and Eastern support for terrorism
made little sense; it is like equating the achievements of professionals
with amateurs. 9
With the advent of the post Cold War

era, the change has brought

little room for these bi-polarlized manipulations of international ter
rorism.

The fundamental effects on the end of the Cold War include not

only the termination of the military confrontation between the former
Soviet Union and United States, but also that old competition is highly
unlikely to reoccur.

First, a main change came in Russian foreign pol

icy. New thinking in the changed policy renounced the Breznev doctrine,
which asserted the right of Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of a be
leaguered Socialist movement worldwide.

It was replaced by the asser

tion that the sovereign right of nations should be honored without in
terference.

One result was to reduce the competition between the East

and West in Third World countries.

Problems remained in the area of
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long-standing competition (such as, Angola, and Mozambique), though
there were attempts to work them out.
mitments or opportunities.

Neither side looked for new com

The Russian motivation appeared to be dual.

On one hand, the competition was usually costly and the benefits of it
short-lived. On the other hand, East-West competition in the Third World
was just another irritant in overall relations.

Faced with the need to

reduce tension in order to gain success to Western assistance, backing
away from a losing propositions was a mild price for the Russians to
pay.
Also, the former Soviet Union simply cannot afford to subsidize
Third World movements; in fact, they were cutting loose as many of their
old clients as possible, including Castro's Cuba, before the Soviet Un
ion dissolved, which helps make Russia and other republics appear as re
sponsible members of the international system.

Above all there is sim

ply not much Third World interest in the new Russia. The old Soviet
system is not something to emulate; rather, it is something to avoid at
all costs.
Now, the United States and Russia are cooperating and sharing re
sponsibility for the anti-terrorist effort on a global scale (as in the
Gulf-War and Bosnian affairs). 10

B. The Characteristics of Dissident Terrorism

!. Nationalist Terrorism: Ethnic Nationalism in War
The forces, mentioned in the causes of post Cold War terrorism, act
on the peoples, states, and societies of the world in such a way as to
exacerbate existing tensions between groups and in many cases, to pro
voke or intensify conflict.

The resulting struggles take several forms,
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all of which have become all-too-common features of the global environ
ment .
One manifestation is the world's decomposing empire and super
states.

By far the most striking products of the Cold War's end and

communism's demise, has been the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Union was an empire, assembled through centuries

of conquest by both Russian Czars and their Communist successors, and
the modern superstate, uniting many individual nations in one centrally
administered, confederated system.
of empire and confederation.

Yugoslavia also possessed attributes

A system of that sort can survive only

when the center possessed enough strength to subdue separatist pressure
in the periphery, and when there are sufficient social, economical, and
political links between the disparate parts to resist the centrifugal
force that

inevitably tears at such an assemblage.

With the collapse of communism —
viet Union and Yugoslavia —

the binding agent in both the So

and growing impact of tectonic forces,

these two superstates broke up in 1991.

The individual groups that had

constituted them sought to establish full sovereignty over what they
viewed as their rightful territory.

As suggested by past instances of

imperial decomposition, such as the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and
Ottoman

Empire after World War I, the process inevitably spawns discord

and conflict. Pieces of new international boundaries (hence fighting be
tween ethnic groups in Bosnia and

between Armenian and Azarbaijans),

and the ethnic minority find themselves trapped within alien and inhos
pitable states (hence the struggles of the Abkhazians and South Os
setians in Georgia, the Ingush and Chechens in Russia, the ethnic Rus
sian in Modova, and the ethic Albanians in the Kosvo region of Serbia).
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Such struggles are not limited to the former Soviet Union and Yugo
slavia; other multinational superstates are feeling the vibration of
tectonic forces.

Hence the survival of Canada remains in doubt as the

French-speaking people of Quebec continue to seek greater autonomy from
the English speaking provinces, while India has experienced significant
separatist pressures in Kashmir, the Panjab, and Assam.

Ethiopia, once

an imperial kingdom, has long been troubled by armed separatist move
ments in the provinces of Eritrea and Tigre, and is likely to experience
renewed conflict if these pressures are not relieved.

Two other Third

World superstates, China and Indonesia, continue to encounter resistance
on their peripheries (the former in Tibet, the latter in East Timor) and
will likely come under intensified pressure from separatist
in the future.
Accompanying the breakup of large multinational states has come a
surge in ethnonationalist and irredentist struggles as ethnic groups
that have been denied a

state

(or have had theirs submerged in a

larger multinational entity) seek to establish one, and as other groups
already in possession of a state seek to enlarge it so as to incorporate
adjacent territories occupied by large number of their kinsmen.

Such

impulses have long sparked fighting, but seems to have gained renewed
vigor in recent years as the bipolar system broke the balance of power
between state authorities and populist elements shifted in favor of the
latter.

As has been noted, ethnonationalist forces are evident in the

separatist struggles in the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, India, China,
and Indonesia.

Other groups engaged in like struggles include the Kurds

in Iraq and Turkey, the Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the
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Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Shan and Karen people of Burma, and the Basques
of France and Spain.
Major irredentist struggles include the Serbians' campaign to
create "Greater Serbia" out of the remains of the remnants of
Yugoslavia, Armenia's push to gain control over Nagorno-Karabakh (now
controlled by Azerbaizan), and China's continuing efforts to repossess
Taiwan.

Many fear that irredentists in Hungary will press for the in

corporation of Hungarian-speaking regions of Slovakia, Romania, and the
former Yugoslavia in a "Greater Hungary."

THE CASE IN THE POINT: New World order and Lessons of the Bosnian War

1. Reporting the tragic situation of the Bosnian War, the July 31,
1933 New York Times reported 200,000 dead, most of them civilian, in
cluding the victims of the detention camps and the children dying for
lack of medical supplies. There has been mass rape.

More than two mil

lion people are homeless; some 573,000 refugees sinking the

already

foundering economics of Groatia and the rump Yugoslavia(Serbia and Mon
tenegro) and 640,000 others destabilizing neighboring countries, the
rest moving from town to town ahead of shifting battle lines.

The num

ber of people who have been killed or left homeless is on a scale not
seen in Europe since the Second World War.
2. The disintegration of the Yugo federation and its interethic
violence cannot be attributed to any single factor. Internal political
conflicts in the 1980, and the effort by Serbian leader Slobodan Mi
losevic to mobilize Serb nationalism on behalf of a strengthened federa
tion, destroyed the cohesion of the country's regional Communist leader-
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ship and weakened their control over society. Deteriorating economical
conditions •—

especially plummeting living standards

eroded the bene

fits of sustaining the Yugoslav state and stimulated the rise of mass
nationalism and interethnic hostilities.

The conflicting nationalist

aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples and their leaders' effort to maxi
mize power, led to conflict over the control of disputed territories.
The end of the Cold War left both Soviet and Western policy makers
believing that Yugoslavia no longer held the strategic significance, or
merited the attention it had enjoyed in a world divided between East and
West.

This mistaken belief, as well as the attention commanded by the

Persian Gulf War, led to the neglect of the brewing crisis in Yugoslavia
until the cost of meaningful action had risen beyond the point accept
able to Western policy makers and their publics.

Even when less costly

but still effective action remained possible. Western policy makers were
deterred from acting by the fear that the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
even if achieved through peaceful negotiations, would hasten the disin
tegration of the Soviet Union.
The fall of Yugoslavia thuB can be attributed to internal conflict
and the international community's failure to respond to the crisis ef
fectively.

However, forceful action by either Yugoslav leaders or

American and European administration would have required innovative
thinking about some of the most basic principles of the international
system and the post Cold War security framework in Euro-Atlantic commu
nity. No political leadership -- Yugoslav, American, or European

was

then ready to confront these tasks, therefore, it may be the stimulus
that it has provided for such new thinking.
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3.

The wars in the former Yugoslavia have made it clear that the

principles and practices that provided a stable frame work for interna
tional security in the era of the Cold War is no longer sufficient to
preserve the peace.

The principle of state sovereignty, territorial in

tegrity, human rights, and self-determination embedded in the United Na
tions Charter and other United Nations Documents, and developed in de
tails in the documents of the Commission on Security

and Cooperation in

Europe (CSCE), have proved contradictory, or at least subject to contra
dictory interpretation.

Moreover, the mounting human tragedy in Bosnia

has revealed the inadequacies of the decision making principles, opera
tional guidelines, and conflict management capabilities of Euro-Atlantic
institutions such as the CSCE, NATO, and the European Community, as well
as the United Nations.
New diplomatic and political mechanisms must be developed to cope
with demands for self-determination in ways that do not undermine the
basic foundation of international stability «*. the system of sovereign
states.
The developments of such mechanisms require reconstruction of the
meaning of self-determinations in the contemporary era and the careful
reconsideration of the indivisibility of state sovereignty.

At the very

least, it requires limiting the ability of states to use their claim to
sovereignty to shield abuses from international inequity.

For any

mechanism, however, individual state and international organization
alike must become more provocative, undertaking preventive diplomatic
and political efforts to solve interethnic and other conflicts before
they threaten international peace.
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International engagement in the Yugo crisis as early as 1990 would
have remained futile if the Western states had continued to refuse to
support the redrawing of borders as a possible path to a peacefully ne
gotiated solution to the crisis.

The declaration of independence by a

territorially compact ethic community, such as that of the Serbs in
Croatia or any other group in Yugoslavia, could have been recognized as
a legitimate demand for self-determination. By recognizing the equal
rights of all peoples in the country to self-determination, interna
tional mediators might have been able to lead local actors toward mutual
concession.

The key to such negotiations, however, lies in the recogni

tion that international principles, and the rights derived from them,
are equally applicable to all parties, as well as in a willingness to
undertake the negotiation of borders.

This, the international community

failed to do.
Early insistence by outside powers on the democratic legitimiza
tion of existing borders might have encouraged greater concern for the
protection of human rights and avoided the escalation of ethnic tensions
in Grotia and Bosnia.

The Communist order that held Yugoslavia together

began to disintegrate as early as 1986.

It entered into a crisis in De

cember 1989. This left sufficient opportunity for international actors
to influence events.

The importance in such a situation of clearly and

forcefully articulating and enforcing the human rights standards to
which states seeking recognition will be held cannot be overemphasized.
By doing so international actors may affect popular perceptions and
politics.

In Yugoslavia, for example, the regional elections held in

1990 might have produced more moderate governments if the human rights
standards of potential ruling parties had been at issue.

The existence of competing claims to territory complicated the
Yugoslav crisis.

But it does not by itself account for the magnitude of

human destruction that has occurred.

The extreme violence in Yugoslavia

must also be attributed to the establishment of ethnically defined gov
ernments that failed to provide democratic safeguards for the human
rights of minority communities.

This reinforces the conclusion that if

the international community is to facilitate the peaceful settlement of
such conflicts elsewhere, it must devise the means to prevent ethnic
domination and safeguard human rights.

In short, principles of sover

eignty, territorial integrity, and national self determination must be
integrated into a single frame work for determining the legitimacy of
claims to political authority.

And that framework must be based on the

superiority of principle human rights and democracy.11

2. Revolutionist Terrorism
a.

Though the appeal of Soviet-style communism

has largely

dissipated, revolutionary and millenarian movements continue to hold an
attraction for downtrodden and dispossessed peoples.

Such movements

promise a change of leaders but a sweeping transformation of society,
typically involving the elimination of existing institutions and their
replacement by more righteous

or egalitarian structures.

of this sort appear to be gaining strength in

Movements

areas, where economic

conditions have worsened for the majority (or for particular groups) and
where the capacity or inclination of state authorities to overcome wide
spread impoverishment and millenarians groups in such areas appear in
creasingly willing to employ violence in their effort to reform society.
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At present two main types of revolutionary crusades can be dis
cerned: ideological or political movements, usually attempting to end
exploitation of the poor by the middle class and the rich; and religious
fundamentalism, entailing a drive to subject all social interaction to
religious law and practice. Examples of the first types include the
Shining Path in Peru, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of
Elsalvador, Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, and the new Peoples Army in the
Philippines; example of the second category would be the Hindu fundamen
talist Bharatiya Janata in India, the Islamic Salvation Front in Alge
ria, the Islamic Jihad in Egypt, and the various Islamic fundamentalist
forces in Afghanistan.
b.

Political Islam should be especially noted with concern.

From Ayatollah Khomeini to Sheik Omar Abdel Rhaman, from Iran to World
Trade Center, government leaders and opinion makers in the West and in
the Middle East have warned of the dangers of militant Islam.

If the

1980s were dominated by image of embassies under siege, American hos
tage, and hijackings, the 1990s bring prophecies of insurgent movements
wielding nuclear weapons and employing urban terrorism. Headlines an
nounce the possibilities of a worldwide Islamic uprising and a clash of
civilizations in which Islam may overwhelm the West. Television viewers
see bodies of Coptic Christian and tourists killed by Egyptian extrem
ists and take in reports of Algerian militants, and pitched battles with
police.

All fuel alarmist concerns reflected in publication and confer

ences with titles like "Roots of Muslim Rage," "Islam: Deadly Duel with
Zealots," and "Awaiting God's
West."

Wrath: Islamic Fundamentalism and the
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The 1990s reveal the diversity and complexity of political Islam
and point to a twenty-first century that will shake the assumption of
many.

While some Islamic organizations engage in terrorism seeking to

topple governments, others spread their message through preaching and
social services and demand the right to gain legitimate power with bal
lots rather than bullets.

However, their movement is directed toward

changing the regional balance of power and driving outside interests
from their region.

Its aims are clearly international, going far beyond

the issue of who governs Lebanon.
C. Finally, the world is confronted with an assortment of pro
democracy and anti-colonial movements, which tend to erupt periodically
in strikes or civil disorders and/or to provoke repressive violence by
the authorities.

All these movements reflect the tectonic increase in

grass-roots activism decried earlier, and while they may experience
setbacks in the short term they are not likely disappear any time soon.
They include: popular drive for Western-style electoral democracy and
human rights, that have been working themselves out in Burma, China,
Haiti, the Philippines,' Thailand, and Zaire; struggles by disenchanted
minorities to abolish unrepresentative or discriminatory governments,
from Northern Ireland to the former South Africa, and efforts by subject
peoples to cast off what is viewed as colonial rule, as in East Timor,
Kashmir, the Western Sahara, and the West Bank and Gaza.

Paralleling

these movements are the increasingly vigorous efforts of indigenous peo
ple to reclaim rights and lands that have long been denied them
dominant cultures. 12

C. Establishment (State) Terrorism

by the
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1. Introduction
The use of terroristic violence and repression by states against
their own citizens is a common phenomenon. In this century alone, tens
of million people, living in most regions of the world, under communist,
democratic, military, and theocratic governments have been and continue
to be victims of state organized repression and violence.

The proto

typical episodes of state violence against its own citizens were those
perpetrated by the Nazi and Stalinist regimes in the 1930s and 1940s.
The unprecedented evils of the Nazi Holocaust and the Great Soviet
Purges have often been viewed as the special consequences of Nazism and
Soviet Communism.

Yet, with frequent recurrence of massive and violent

state repression in other parts of world since the 1940s, there has been
greater awareness that these horrors are not restricted to a narrow
range of cultures or types of regime.

It has become evident that the

phenomenon has deeper, or more global roots and is tied to increasingly
sophisticated and continuously expanding bureaucratic and technical ca
pabilities of states everywhere for violence and repression. 13
Recent developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
seem to indicate a global trend toward the liberalization of society and
the diminution of state organized terror.

Politicians, journalists, and

scholars, around the world, are already trumpeting the coming of a bet
ter and more human world.

A closer look, however, at the nations of

world shows that the phenomenon of state organized terror is far from
vanquished.

Even as Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia liberalize, other

states continue unabated in the repression of their own citizens.
salient case is China and that new symbol of state terror, Tianamen

The

75

Square.

Others that come to mind easily are the cases of South Africa,

Iraq, Iran, Haiti, El Salvador, Burma, and Sri Lanka.

These are but the

most obvious cases that have been subjected to the glare of media atten
tion.

There are numerous others that are little known because of state

control and secrecy, or because the violence has not been dramatic
enough to draw media attention.

North Korea, Guatemala, and Burundi are

but a few of the examples that would fit into this category.
In spite of this increased awareness, there is little theoretical
knowledge available about the nature and sources of state organized ter
ror.

Unfortunately, the severe scholarly

neglect of the subject of

violence and terror is just a part of neglect of more general subject of
repression.

Even when histories and political accounts of extremely re

pressive regimes have been written, they usually have not analyzed the
origins, the instruments, the politics, and the effects of terror it
self. At least three fundamental factors are responsible for this lack
of attention.

First, information on violent internal repression is ex

tremely scarce since most of the relevant documents have been intention
ally destroyed or kept secret, while journalistic investigation has been
severely restricted.

To compound the problem, victims of violent terror

often disappear or fear bearing witness to events.

Second, outside in

vestigation of the state's terroristic exercise of power over its own
population has been viewed as interference with state sovereignty.

Only

recently has the protection of human and civil rights become a legiti
mate issue of international concern.

Third, predominant theoretical

frameworks have failed to identify repressive state violence and terror
as phenomena that are central to the modern state and which therefore
require attention. 14
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Some serious attempts were made at the end of the 1960s toward ex
tending the theoretical understanding of state organized terror by
broadening the comparative frame work. Alexander Dallin and George
Breslauer, in their book Political Terror in the Communist System, took
the logical step of searching for parallels between China and the Soviet
Block countries by looking at the relationship of terror to political
and economical development.

E.V. Walter, in his book Terror and Resis

tance, attempted to provide a new perspective on totalitarian terror by
examining terror in the Zulu empire of the

nineteenth century. Virtu

ally no one built on either these works until the 1980.
The most notable works are a volume on secret police in communist
states by Jonathan Adelman, and three volumes on state violence and re
pression edited by Michael Stohl and George Lopez, which aim to provide
a framework for a broader comparative analysis and to define a relevant
body of literature.
2. The Relationship of State to Society
The ideal relationship of state to society was articulated by such
thinkers as Hobbes, Hegel, and Rousseau prior to the disasters of the
twentieth century.

It may be said that most of them saw the state as an

institution that, like a gift from heaven, could bring peace to mankind,
prevent people from mutual destruction, and introduce some measure of
order into their lives.

It was unthinkable to them that the state

could, like ferocious beast, assail its own citizens, Rousseau contended
that the subjects do not need to assume that the organism will want to
damage its members.15
Much of this respect for the state was based on its performance of
three essential functions:

a) maintenance of internal peace and order,
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b) organization and protection of economic activity, and, c) defense of
national independence and national interests.
Today, the state has lost some of its authority as the guardian of
order and the protector of its own citizens.

In the twentieth century,

the state, like an unchained beast, has ferociously attacked that whose
claim to be its master, its own citizens.
In most cases, people could not understand the cause of this rage
or the desire to destroy those who seemingly were an important means of
support for the state, and ultimately its very reason for existence.
The fruit of this perversion of the state has been the human rights
movement whose theme has been liberation from the
state and whose greatest fulfillment and

iron grip of the

validation has been the price

set in motion by Gorbachev's glasnost.
The image of state as the defender of national integrity and inde
pendence has also been seen as misleading in its neglect of the state's
behavior in multi-ethnic and multi-national dominions.

The states tend

to be chauvinistic and jingoistic, often seeing in the persecution of
minorities in the territory the best way to gain the support of the
state in the twentieth century, and acted aggressively against the mem
bers of minority ethnic group much more than it has come to their de
fense.

The states of Hitler and Stalin are just the most terrible exam

ples of this general tendency. 16
3. The Characteristics of State Terrorism
Politics is the process whereby we deliberately set out to shape
our communities of interaction.

We do so by drawing upon the power

resources at our disposal. One of these resources, whether we wish to
recognize it or not, is the capacity to do harm, or coercive resources.
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Violence is a form of coercion, and terrorism is usually a type of vio
lence.

Physical coercion, or its threat, is commonly considered the re

source of last resort, to be used only when other available resources
have failed to shape community interaction.

Basically, coercion in

cludes all acts intended to harm others or their

valued possessions.

Coercion permeates political life, from mild acts of parental dis
cipline to devastating acts of war.

Stable political communities estab

lish and enforce limits on the use of coercion in social relations.
Acts of coercion that violate the limits within a particular community
may

be termed force.

The notion of acceptable coercion or force

implies a dominant consensus that the benefits of the coercive acts out
weigh the harm done, as when the police use coercion to apprehend a
criminal.
Acts of coercion in violation of these limits but intended to de
fend the

dominant order from a type of threat subversion may be termed

establishment (state) violence. 17
Establishment violence, we must emphasize, need not be terrorist in
nature, nor is it confined to public officials exceeding their authority
(for example, police violation). Moreover, establishment terrorism
needs not to be a form of violence, in that a regime could conceivably
carry out a terrorist policy that conforms with the dominant definition
of acceptable coercion.

We need to make, therefore, some careful dis

tinctions .
First, some analysts distinguish between oppression
sion.

and depres

Oppression is essentially a condition of exploitation and depri

vation (somewhat akin to the notion of "structural violence"), and
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repression is action against those who are seen to be threats to the es
tablished order.

Repression, then, may serve to maintain an oppressive

system, but the oppression itself

arises out of the realities of social

existence for the people it oppresses.

A land tenure system, for exam

ple, may ensure the economical oppression of the majority peasants, who
may require periodic repression when they demonstrate signs of unrest.
Repression may be within or in violation of the boundaries defining
acceptable coercion, or force.

In addition, strategies of repression

may be undertaken by both private citizens and public officials.

Some

times private repression may stay within authorized limits, as when
citizens "taken the law into their hands."
Some instances of both officials and private repression may be
a form of violence but still not be terrorist.

Terrorism depends on the

nature of the target and the indiscriminateness of the means.

If group

of persons track down and knife the rapist of their friend, they may be
vigilantes, but they are not terrorists.

On the other hand, the random

violence of the Ku Klux Lan against southern blacks certainly appears to
be terrorism.

Some but not all cases of privates vigilantism, there

fore, may be terrorist. 10
4. Conditions Associated with the Emergence of State Organized
Terror
What follows is proposed as a theoretical template for the phenome
non of state organized terror.

It has been constructed out of an analy

sis of all papers presented at the International Conference entitled,
"State Organized Terror," hosted by Michigan State University, November
2-5,1988.
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Four general conditions seemed to be associated with the emergence
of state organized terror. They are: a) distorted conception of the
state and society and their interrelationship, b) the disarray of state
institutions, c) the presence of deep economical and or/ ethnic con
flicts in society or between the society and the state, and 4) state de
pendence on foreign power. 19
The first fundamental condition associated with state organized
terror is that terrorist regimes are typically animated by ideologies
sharply at odds with reality and by unrealistic ambition for social and
economical control.

Communist regimes, such as those in the Soviet Un

ion, China, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea, see society in term of class
struggle and attempts

to radically transform feudal and capitalist

structures of land tenure and enterprise.

One party, military-dominated

regimes, on the other hand, tend to see the nations as an organism that
must be dedicated to survival in the face of external aggressors whose
agents are seen behind all independent political movements within the
country.

The National Security Doctr ine of the Argentine military in

the 1970s and the concept of "total onslaught" guiding

the South Afri

can government until very recently are examples of this world view.
The second fundamental condition is great institutional chaos and
disorganization, which breeds particularly intense political rivalries
within state apparatus.

Terror has grown out of such a context even in

cases, such as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, where the state has
seemed monolithic and all powerful to its victims and external enemies.
The chaos of state may exist because its various agencies have no
clearly defined missions or means of carrying out their duties, or have
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overlapping responsibilities.

The danger in such political chaos, par

ticularly where the state is facing obvious and severe economical prob
lems or military threat, is the emergence of political rhetoric empha
sizing boundless will and energy and simplistic absolutes.

Such rheto

ric can take root and thrive because there are no established bureau
cratic structures of decision making or political norms to support meas
ured evaluation of polices.
Economical and ethnic division is the third general condition asso
ciated with state organized terror.

Economical growth has often been

created from a large group of landless peasants and new industrial work
ing class that has lost their

economical security while commercial and

political elites have grown wealthy.

The resulting political volatility

and motivated severe repression response has caused revolutions that
have installed repressive regimes.

Economical factors in state terror

have been most salient in Latin America and are becoming more important
in Africa with increased industrialization.
The violence of a state against its citizens is also often built
upon to reinforce preexisting racial and ethnic conflicts.

Ethnic con

flicts, however, rarely lead to massive violence unless cultural and re
ligious differences correspond to some degree with differences in eco
nomical or political status.

Often ethnic differences will be exagger

ated by a regime, such as Hitler's, as a way of crystallizing a defini
tion of the enemy, which will add the force of ethnic antagonism to
their own political support.

Where subjugated ethnic groups are cultur

ally cohesive and engage in subversion or violence against dominant
groups, as Kurds have in Iraq the way

is clear for legitimization of

mass political murder by the dominant group.

This is the case in many
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Third World states that had not previously developed a common political
culture or means of balancing interest.
The fourth condition associated with state organized terror in
volves its international context.

Repressive and terroristic regimes

have often been regimes that have gained power with the military, finan
cial, and political support of another, more powerful state.

The clear

est examples are the Eastern European nations and Afghanistan, but sev
eral severely repressive regimes in Latin America and elsewhere have
come to power as a result of US support.

Such externally installed re

gimes tend to violent repression for control. Many violent regimes in
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, though not installed
by external power, have built up their security and police forces with
heavy foreign assistance.

Such foreign aid has been aimed largely at

maintaining secure conditions for production and trade by keeping vola
tile opposition political activity in check, and at increasing influence
to achieve geopolitical goals. 20

THE CASE IN THE POINT: Iraqi State Terrorism to the Kurdish Minority

A. The Historical and Socio-Political Background of Kurdish
Problem in Iraq
Because of history and geography, the Kurdish question has been one
of the thorniest problems of twentieth-century Iraq.

A distinctive eth

nic group of Indo-European origins and of Muslim, mainly Sunni faith,
the Kurdish community comprises more than twenty percent of Iraq's popu
lation (18 million), and resides in northern part of the country.
the

In

wake of World War I, as a great power re-carved the Middle East

following the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the Kurd was promised autonomy
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by the Treaty of Severe(1920), with an option for complete independence,
only to realize three years later that they had been cheated out of this
pledge: the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the victorious allies
bore no specific reference to the Kurds, promising only tolerance for
minorities.
Since then

the Kurds have been one of the largest aggrieved na

tional minorities in the Middle East, the intractability of their situa
tion stemming from their dispersion in four Middle Eastern countries -Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria (there is also a small Kurdish minority in
the Soviet Union) —

each having a vested interest in suppressing the

Kurds' national aspiration.

The Kurdish predicament has been further

irritated by the fragmentation of the community along linguistic, clan
and tribal lines, which has impaired the crystallization of a collective
Kurdish identity and has facilitated their suppression by the respective
governments. 21
In the Iraqi case, Kurdish separatism has been particularly discon
certing for the central government.

It threatens Iraq's fragile sectar

ian edifice, thereby raising the fearful specter of the possible disin
tegration of the entire state into three entities: Kurdish, Shiite, and
Sunni.

This, in turn, might have rendered Iraq a non-viable whole,

given the fact that approximately two thirds of country's oil production
and oil reserves come from a predominantly Kurdish area, and Kurdish
fertile lands make it Iraq's main granary.
Because of these weighty considerations, the central government in
Baghdad had always been adamant on keeping Kurdistan an integral part of
»

Iraq.

The Kurds, for their part, sheltered by rugged mountains terrain

that made military operation in the area extremely difficult, embarked
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on a sustained struggle against the regime, which has continued with
varied intensity to date.

They asked for a proportional representation

in Iraq's official institution, including the cabinet, the parliament
and the army, and demanded a proportional share in the country's eco
nomical resources.

These demands were to no avail, as was their claim

for autonomy in Kurdistan. 22
B. Early B'athi Regime's Terrorism to the Kurd
The Kurds waged continuous guerrilla warfare (1961-70) and open re
bellion (1974-75) against the Iraqi government.
regime was established in February 1963,

When the first Ba'thi

The Kurds quickly presented it

with far a reaching plan for an autonomous region in Kurdistan.

The

plan was dismissed out of hand, and in the summer of 1963, the Ba'th
launched a ferocious military campaign in Kurdistan.

This proved a

serious mistake that contributed to the collapse of the first Ba'thi
regime.
Fighting in Kurdistan continued throughout the 1960s.

Bath's re

turn to power in 1968 and responded to mounting rebellion by rushing
most of the Iraqi army (four out of six divisions) to northern Iraq.
Fierce fighting ensued in which the military did not shy away from in
discriminate attacks against helpless civilians.

One of the better-

known atrocities took place in the Kurdish state of Dankan in August
1969, and was painstakingly recorded by the Kurdish Affairs Bulletin:
The children and the women of the village escaped to one of
the caves in the vicinity, for fear of artillery shelling
and bombing by air-craft. After burning the village, the
officers and mercenaries assembled near the entry of the
cave, collected wood, and after sprinkling the wood with petrol
they set fire to it. The cries of the children and women begun
rising to God. They were shooting at the entry of the cave so
that no one could escape, and so were burnt, 67 children and
and women in the cave. 23
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C. The Kurd's open rebellion against Iraqi government
The events in Kurdistan were viewed by Saddam (then Vice Chairman of
Bathi Party) with grave concern. He was mindful of the destabilizing im
pact of the Kurdish problem on the previous Ba'thi regime and feared
that an overriding preoccupation with it yet again would threaten the
Ba'this' rule and, what is more important, undermine his position within
the

party.
He knew that suppression of an all-out Kurdish rebellion would re

quire a sustained military effort.

Particularly considering massive

Iranian support likely to be given to the Kurdish rebels. It was clear
that the economical cost of such a civil war would be exorbitant, espe
cially if the Kurds were to handicap Iraq's oil industry.

Also he was

fully aware that Iraq's immersion in Kurdistan would play into Iran's
hand and would enable them to impose their will on Iraq on a variety of
issues, most notably the navigation rules in the Shatt-al-Arab, Iraq's
sole access to the Gulf.

Saddam sought a peaceful resolution to the

Kurdish problem.
In Autumn 1969 Hussein enter into secret negotiations with Kurdish
leader, Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani and on March 11,1970, his efforts
culminated in a Fifteen Point Agreement which contained far-reaching
concession to the Kurds, most importantly, the first Iraqi recognition
of the Kurds as a distinct national entity and their consequent right to
autonomy.

Other concessions included a recognition of cultural, lin

guistic and administrative rights, the appointment of a Kurd as Vice
President of Iraq and the enhancement of Kurdish representation within
the state's ruling institutions. 24
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Had he adhered to the spirit of the March 1970 Manifesto, which he
had personally engineered, and implemented into the letter, the Kurdish
re- volt might have been averted.

As things developed, Saddam overesti

mated his ability to impose his own solution on the Kurds and was conse
quently forced to fight simultaneously on two fronts, the Kurds and Ira
nian Shah.
Barzani demanded that main bulk of the Iraqi army be withdrawn from
Kurdistan according to the agreement, but Saddam refused it.

Barzani

chose a close associate of his, Muhammed Habib Karim, secretary-general
of the KDP, as the Kurdish candidate for the position of vice President,
but Baghdad did not accept this choice, Barzani also accused Saddam of
"Arabizing" Kurdistan (in September 1971, some 40,000 Shi'ite Kurds were
expelled to Iran on grounds that they were not Iraqi), and in 1972
alone, tens of thousands Kurds of Iranian origin were forced out of Iraq
to make rooms for the growing numbers of Iraqi Arabs arriving in the
area.

On September 29,1971, Barzani himself narrowly escaped an attempt

on his life.

He interpreted the attempt on his life as a defacto decla

ration of war by Hussein.
Saddam nationalized the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1872, a
consortium owned by several Western countries, which accounted for the
entire oil production of Iraq and effectively controlled prices and quo
tas.

This oil nationalization was particularly galling for Barzani who

viewed this move as a blatant violation of the manifesto, aimed at dis
inheriting the Kurds of their right to the oil rich area of Kirkuk.
On April 9, 1972, Iraq and Soviet Russia, signed a bilateral treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation.

This was the second treaty of its kind
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signed by the Soviet Union with a Middle Eastern country in the post
World War II era after Egypt in 1971.

Indeed, in theses two important

respects the Soviet Union alliance failed to live up to Hussein's expec
tations.

While offering its good offices to mediate between Baghdad and

Kurds, and between Iran and Iraq, Moscow was unable to bring about a po
litical solution.

Alarmed by

the improvement in Soviet-Iraqi rela

tions, the United States and Iran stepped up their support for the Kurd
ish insurgency.

This, in return, made Barzani more defiant than ever.

He dismissed Saddam's offer to join the National Patriotic Front, ac
cused the government of

consistent evasion of its commitments in the

March Manifesto, and resumed the guerrilla warfare against the Iraqi
forces in Kurdistant .2S
The Iraqi campaigning was initially successful, but by the fall of
1974 it had already ground to a halt.

Having failed to sever the Kurd

ish supply lines with Iran (and Syria that also extended material help
to Kurds), the Iraqi army was confronted by Bazaar's well-equipped guer
rillas, armed with heavy artillery and surface-to-air missiles.

The

Iraqi predicament was decisively compounded when the Iranian army en
tered the fighting on the side of Kurds, going as far as to deploy two
regiments inside Iraq in January 1975.
bellion -- over $4 billion

The exorbitant cost of the re

according to some estimates -- threatened to

bring the country to the brink of economical disaster.

As Sadamm was to

admit candidly several years later, the human toll exacted by the Kurd
ish campaign in the year between March 1974 and March 1975 exceeded
60,000 casualties.
With the Iraqi army on the verge of collapse and the economy se
verely afflicted, the Iranian Shah was virtually holding Baghdad by its
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throat. At will, he could dismember Iraq; at will he could topple the
Ba'thi regime.

Fortunately for Saddam and his associates, all the Shah

wanted was an unequivocal Iraqi recognition of Iran's geopolitical he
gemony in the Gulf that concretely, required the legal revision of the
navigation rule in Shatt-al-Arab and some minor territorial concession.
Moreover, while using the Kurds as a pawn in imposing his will on Iraq,
the Shah had no intention of allowing the Kurds to gain excessive power.
Since Iran was burdened with its own Kurdish problem, an autonomous, let
alone independent, Kurdistan would inevitably bode ill.
On March 6, 1975, Hussein and the Shah concluded the Algiers agree
ment that, at one stroke, terminated armed confrontation between two
countries, settled the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, and paved the way for the
suppression

of the Kurdish rebellion.

In concluding the Agreement,

Saddam's mind was occupied by an immediate resolution of the Kurdish
problem on his own terms, which was a matter of life and death. Had he
not reached such a solution, his entire future would have been jeopard
ized; had he not bowed to the superior Iranian power, such a solution
would not have been feasible.

Faced with the choice between a humiliat

ing foreign policy concession and political demise, the way out a was
self- evident.

Saddam ofted for the former and achieved his objective:

forty-eight hours after the signature of the Algiers Agreement, Iran had
withdrawn its support for the Kurds, and within two weeks the Kurdish
rebellion had been effectively suppressed. 26
The Kurdish minority again became the victim of international power
politics.

What is noteworthy here is the attitude of American govern

ment: In May 1972, US President Richard Nixon approved a CIA plan to
grant Barzani some $16 million over a three-year period.

Barzani be
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lieved that the United States, in the capacity as Iran’s foremost ally,
could provide a safety valve that the Shah would not be able to remove
at will. His assumption proved wrong.

The United States did not lift a

finger to prevent the Shah from betraying the Kurds. 27

D. Iraqi Genocidal Repression in the Iran-Iraq War
Iraqi Kurdish separatists later backed Iran in the Iran-Iraq War.
Hussein found that the Kurdish threat during the early war years less
ominous than previously anticipated.

The tribal and linguistic fragmen

tation of the Kurdish community and long standing enmity between its two
resistance groups, Mas'ud Barzani's KDP, and Jalal Talabani's PUK, pre
cluded a joint Kurdish strategy and enabled the regime to pit them
against each other.

It was only after Iran had launched its first major

offensive into Kurdistan in the summer of 1983 that the Kurdish opposi
tion became a real irritant to central regime.

Yet even Hussein managed

to keep the two Kurdish Organizations apart.
While the KDP was brutally repressed, with some 8000 members of the
Barzan's clan imprisoned, the PUK was carefully courted through substan
tial financial inducements and ambiguous political pledges.

Before

long, however, Talbani discovered that he had been double-crossed by
Hussein who had no intention whatsoever of rehabilitating Kurdistan or
promoting Kurdish autonomy at the expense of the central government.
Frustrated and angry, he curtailed the dialogue with the authorities,
buried his differences with Barzani and joined the KDP campaign against
the regime. Thus,in early 1985, Hussein was confronted with full scale
insurrection in Kurdistan.

In a last-ditch effort to deflect the Kurd
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ish insurgency, the Iraqi President offered a general amnesty "for all
Iraqis who conducted activities hostile to their country."

When the

offer was spurned by the disillusioned Kurds, a ferocious campaign was
launched against them.

With the passage of time and the deterioration

in Iraq's military position, this campaign assumed genocidal propor
tions, when the Iraqi forces retaliated for what they viewed as treach
erous Kurdish behavior. Not only were the 8,000 prisoner

captured in

1983 executed, along with hundreds of other members of the Kurdish oppo
sition, but the government embarked again on a systematic effort to up
root the rebellious population from its native environment.

By the end

of the Iran-Iraq war in the summer of 1988, more than half of the vil
lages and numerous towns in Kurdistan had been razed and their popula
tion deported.

Some half a million Kurds were placed either in easily

controllable settlements in the vicinity of the main towns in Kurdistan,
or in concentration camps in the south-western Iraqi dessert. 20
Commended by Hussein's paternal cousin, Ali Hassan ai-Majid, this
punitive campaign witnessed the extensive use of chemical weapons, in
cluding mustard gas, cynaide, and Tabun nerve agent against the unpro
tected civilian population.

The first attacks of this kind were re

ported in May 1987, when some twenty villages were gassed in an attempt
to deter the civilian population in Kurdistan from collaborating
the advancing Iranian forces.

with

A month later several Kurdish villages in

Iran were given the same "medicine," with some 100 people dead and 2,000
injured.

The most appalling attack took place in March 1988, when the

specter of a major Iranian breakthrough

in Kurdistan drove Hussein to

employ gas on an unprecedented scale against the Kurdish town of Ha-
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labja.

As the thick cloud of gas spread by the Iraqi plane evaporated

into the clear sky, television crews were rushed into town by the Irani
ans and the world discovered the full extent of this horrendous massa
cre.

Five thousand people —

killed that day.

men, women, children and babies —

were

Nearly 10,000 suffered injuries. 19

E. The Kurdish Revolt after the Gulf War
The Gulf war dramatically changed the opposition's fortune soon af
ter its start.

The allied coalition's mobilization against Saddam

raised the hope among the opposition that it would no longer be ignored
by the international community; dissident groups redoubled their efforts
to reestablish a common anti-Saddam platform and began to court members
of the coalition.

In December 1990, almost all the members of the Iraqi

opposition convened at a conference in Damascus and established a steer
ing group, the Joint Action Committee, that condemned Saddam's dictator
ship and called for his removal and free elections.
The Kurdish revolt erupted in both rural and urban area when Kurd
ish civilians, including professional and intellectuals as well as tens
of thousands of Fursan members (Kurdish irregulars), joined the Iraqi
Kurdistan front(IKF), which was made up of smaller Kurdish groups, and
the rival Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK). Massoud Barzani, the head of KDP, and Jalal

Talabani, the

leader of PUK, acted quickly to take control of the rebellion and en
gaged their veteran guerrilla units in attacks against government
forces.

Within days, and for the first time in their history, the guer

rillas took several major urban centers, including the oil center of
Kirkuk.

By mid-March the IKF had declared that 75 percent of Kurdistan
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was in rebel hands. The groups rapidly moved to restore essential serv
ices and civil administration in the "liberated" areas.
After crushing the revolt in the south, Baghdad moved its forces to
north and launched an offensive to retake all urban centers by April 1.
Lacking experience in urban warfare and hoping to spare urban popula
tion, the guerrillas fled into the mountains, but they found that they
could not conduct war in rural areas because they had been depopulated
and turned into free-fire zones.
The reason for the collapse is clear: the guerrillas were not as
combat ready as the Iraqi forces. Talabani noted that he did not realize
that the Republican Guards were still in good shape. Neither the IFK nor
he and international community expected what happened as the revolt col
lapsed: hundred of thousands of civilians began an exodus from northern
Iraq, that at its height, encompassed more than 50 percent of the Kurd
ish population.

Thousands of people died because of cold weather or

lack of food as they escaped to the safety of Iran or Turkey.

The exo

dus may have been prompted by fear of reprisals by government forces,
including the possibility that chemical weapons might be used, as they
had been in 1988.
The refugee problem received enormous international media coverage,
prompting a massive humanitarian effort to provide the refugees with
food, medicine, and shelter.

On April 5, the U.N. Security Council

adopted Resolution 688, which approved the establishment of "Safe Haven"
in Iraqi north of the thirty-six parallels that were protected by coali
tion military forces; Kurdish civilians were encouraged to return to
that protected zone.
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Despite their commitment to overthrow Saddam, defeated Kurds had no
choice but to negotiate.

Bagdad balked at many of Kurds' demands: they

adamantly refused to cede Kirkuk, arguing that the city did not have a
Kurdish majority; it also had no intention of losing control over a sub
stantial part of the country's oil. The Kurds were reluctant to sign an
agreement, and there were reports of a growing rift between Barzani and
Talabani. Barzani distrusted international guarantees and wished to
conclude an agreement with Badgered, while Talabani supported the main
stream opposition's belief that Kurdish autonomy and democracy in Iraq
would develop if Saddam were overthrown. 30

F. The Safe Haven for the Kurd
As mentioned above, In mid-April 1991, the United States, Britain,
France, and the Netherlands, acting on a plan first advanced by British
Prime Minister John Major, created the safe haven north of the thirtysix parallel.

With Operation Provide Comfort, coalition troops facili

tated a massive Kurdish repatriation while squeezing out the Iraqi gov
ernment' s authority.

When the last coalition soldier left northern Iraq

on July 15, 1991. the four to five million Iraqi Kurds controlled an
area that comprised 80 percent of the predominantly Kurdish areas in
Iraq. By the end of September, all Kurdish-dominated areas in Iraq ex
cept the city of Kirkuk had come under local Kurdish control.
The Kurdish zone covers 36,000 square miles, running from the Tigris
River in the west eastward to the border with Iran, and including the
Cizre-Dohuk-Amadiya triangle that made up original the safe haven; it
also extends along the Iranian border south to Halabja and west to
Suleimania and Arbil.
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The Kurds maintain a Western-supported de facto government in the
region, supported by some 100,000 armed Kurdish fighters.

The zone re

mains under the UN embargo of Iraq as well as an internal Iraqi block
ade .

G. The Typology of Iraqi State Terrorism to The Kurdish Minority

1.

The condition associated with Iraqi state terrorism to the Kurd

ish minority could be classified mainly as ethnic conflicts in society.
This condition is deeply related to the domestic economic stake and the
regional struggle for hegemony among the peripheral countries: Iran,
Turkey, Syria and Russia.
- As previously indicated, the Kurdish minority occupies more
than twenty percent of Iraq's population, therefore, Kurdish separatism
has been particularly disconcerting for the central government.
threatens Iraq's fragile

It

sectarian edifice, raising the fearful specter

of possible disintegration of the entire state into three entities:
Kurdish, Shi'te, and Sunni.
- Economically two thirds of the country's oil production and
oil reserves come from a predominantly Kurdistan's fertile lands make it
Iraq's main granary. The Iraqi government was shocked when Barzani de
clared in interview with the Washington Post in the summer of 1973, "The
Kurdish territory is rich in petrol.

We are lawful owners. If support

were strong enough, we could control the Kirkuk field and give it to an
American company to operate."
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- The Kurd's total population is estimated at twenty-five mil
lion (1992), of which most are in Turkey (52 percent), Iraq (18 per
cent) , and Iran (24 percent) . 31
Because of this peculiar environment, the Kurds have been often used as
a surrogate force in destabilizing others, in the struggle for hegemony
in the region: for instance the Kurdish open rebellion with the support
from the Shah of Iran in 1961-70 and Iraqi Kurdish support in the
Iran-Iraqi War in 1980-1988.
- Because of this weighty consideration, central government in
Baghdad had always been adamant about keeping Kurdistan an integral part
of Iraq by whatever means available -- including state organized terror
ism.
2.

As mentioned above, Sederberge classify state terrorism into

four models from an institutionalization point of view: vigilante, cov
ert official, overt official, and genocide. What model Iraqi terrorism
falls under is dependent upon specific individual situations.
It should be noted the Iraqi government does not always resort to
the repressive measures in dealing with the Kurdish affairs.

They often

have employed domesticating efforts to assimilate the Kurd as well as
divide-and-rule political technique, because suppression of all-out Kudish rebellion would require a sustained military effort, particularly in
the light of the massive support from the neighboring countries like
Iran; economic cost of such civil war, especially if the Kurds were to
handicap Iraq's oil industry would be great.

For example, on March 11,

1970, the Iraqi government's domesticating efforts culminated in a 15
point agreement, which contained far reaching concessions to the Kurds

96

including recognition of Kurds as a distinctive national entirety and
their right to autonomy.

32

- Vigilante and covert terrorism models are quite limited in
the effectiveness in application to the Kurds because their homogeneous
communities shattered in rugged mountainous area in northern Iraq and
even full scale military operations had been very difficult to achieve
their missions
ties.

not to mention vigilante and covert terrorism activi

Of course Iraqi intelligence institutions have vigorously engaged

in harassment and assassination of tribal leaders, but this rather re
pressive action could not be considered state terrorism; terrorism, as
defined earlier, depends upon the nature of the target and the discrimi
nation of the means.
- The main characteristics of state terrorism by the Iraqi
government, therefore, fall under overt terrorism models, in the face of
open rebellions of Kurds, in many cases supported by a neighboring coun
try.

The Kurds most nationalist activity since 1946 was in Iraq.

There

Kurds waged continuous guerrilla warfare (1961-70), and open rebellion
(1974-75), against

the Iraqi government.

This movement collapsed as

mentioned before, unofficial Iranian support was withdrawn after a 1975
Iran-Iraq War.
In 1988, the Iraqi government was accused of using chemical weapons
against the Kurds.

They again revolted after Iraq's defeat in the 1991

Persian Gulf War.

When rebellion failed, more than a million of them

fled their homes.

As the death toll among the Kurds mounted, US mili

tary forces built a camps for them in northern Iraq.
of this camp was later

assumed by the United Nations.

The administration
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I would like to introduce here two typical examples of the Iraqi govern
ment's terrorism to the Kurds.
- In a last-ditch effort to deflect the Kurdish insurgency in
1988, a ferocious campaign was launched.

This campaign assumed genoci-

dal proportions; not only were the 8,000 "prisoners" captured in 1983
executed, along with hundreds of other members of the Kurdish opposi
tion, but

government embarked again on a systematic effort to uproot

the rebellious population from its native environment.

By the end of

the Iran-Iraq war in the summer of 1988, more than half of the villages
and numerous towns in Kurdistan were razed and their
ported.

population de

Some half a million Kurds were placed in either

easily con

trollable settlements in the vicinity of the main towns in Kurdistan, or
in concentration camps in the south-western Iraqi dessert.
This punitive campaign witnessed the extensive use of chemical
weapons, including mustard gas, cyanide, and Tabun nerve against the un
protected civilian population. The most appalling attack, as described
earlier in detail, took place in March 1988. Five thousand people -men, women, children and babies -- were killed in those days.

Nearly

10,000 suffered injuries. 33
- Neither the Iraqi Kurdistan Front nor the international com
munity expected what happened as the open revolt in March 1991 after
Gulf War, crashed.

Hundred of thousands of civilians began an exodus

from northern Iraq that encompassed more than fifty percent of the Kurd
ish populations.

Thousand of people died because of cold weather or

lack of food as they escaped to the safety of Iran or Turkey.

The exo

dus may have been prompted by fear of reprisals by the government
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forces, including the possibility that chemical weapons might be used,
as they had been in 1998.

The refugee problem received enormous inter

national media coverage, prompting a massive humanitarian effort to pro
vide the refugees with food, medicines, and shelters. 34
3.

The world media often reported that Iraqi state terrorism, espe

cially gassing of the Kurdish populace in 1988 were of genocidal propor
tion.

We admit that Iraqi state terrorism in its savageness and in its

enormous scale could be called "genocidal," but this terrorist policy
still had some limits.

It was not aimed to kill all the Kurdish popu

lace, neither was it intended to liquidate the entire structure of Kurd
ish existing institutions.

Genocide, already examined earlier, should

include: first, genocide represents a systematic effort over time to
liquidate a national population, usually a minority; second, it func
tions as a fundamental political policy to assure the conformity and
participation by the citizenry.
up to these points.

The Iraqi state terrorism has not been

So, we could still categorize it as overt terrorism

but as a worst case. 35

H. Conclusion
Could the Kurdish Safe Haven

protec ted by the allied coalition

survive in the future free from Iraqi state terrorism?

It is a diffi

cult question in view of the following considerations.

At least the

"haven" will be put under harsh challenge by the Iraqi state.
First, basically speaking, the Kurdish

community comprises more

than twenty percent of Iraq's population. Kurdish separatism is particu
larly discouraging for the central government.
fragile

sectarian edifices —

It threatens Iraq's

leading to the possible disintegration of
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the entire state into three entities .-Kurdish, Shiite; and moreover, two
thirds of the country's oil production comes from a predominantly Kurd
ish area, and Kurdistant fertile lands make it Iraq's main granary.

The

Kurdish separation is a matter of life and death.
Second, the portrait of Saddam as an omnipotent ruler was shattered
by

his defeat in the war and by the intensity of the insurrections.

Profound bitterness was expressed by many who felt that Saddam had badly
miscalculated or blundered into a trap laid for him by the coalition.
Yet, he is the symbol of Iraq's achievements; he brought Iraq into an
era of military strength and scientific progress.

The message is clear:

only under Saddam can Iraq regain its former strength; and the main
stream of people has shown their belief that if Saddam is overthrown the
situation will not improve but, rather, deteriorate dramatically. 36
Third, according to the record of the UN inspection teams in mid
summer 1991, the war had destroyed between 45 and 50 percent of a huge
inventory, but Iraq still retained 2,400 tanks, 4,400 armored personnel
carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, between 1,000 and 2,000 artil
lery pieces, and 250 multiple rocket launchers.

The army has been re

structured; Iraq now has between 350,000 and 400,000 troops, of which
the Republican Guard constitutes a substantial and growing element.
The army is a more professional force that would be more formidable if
Iraq were allowed to rearm.

Saddam is in tight control of the entire

army and will never hesitate to use it for maintaining integrity of
tionhood

na

the coercion side of the political process. 37

And last, the Kurd are helplessly divided among themselves by vari
ous sections as already mentioned.

Though they have a strong self-

identity, the Kurds are not yet ethnically unified, separated as they
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are by language, custom, neo-feudal obligations and physical distance.
The formation of a united front for achieving

political purpose, as

evidenced in their tumultuous history, has often ended in frustration.
This vulnerable point has expediently been used by Iraqi authority in
divide and rule, and sometimes also by neighboring countries, getting
them involved in regional power games.
It is difficult to believe that either side in negotiations that
followed

the Kurdish uprising in March 1991 was doing more than buying

time before the next round of fighting began.

After all, that is not

what happened to previous negotiations in 1958 to 1961, during the
1960s, in 1970 to 1974, and in 1983 to 1984.
Saddam's objectives in starting the talks seem to

have been to

neutralize the Kurdish resistance movements, playing for time following
his shattering defeat in the Gulf War, and dividing the Iraqi opposi
tion.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Terrorism can be reduced but not eradicated because however demo
cratic society, however near to perfection the social institution, there
will

always be alienated and disaffected people, some of whom will be

aggressive and more interested in violence than in freedom and tolerance
-- the very source terrorism.

The reaction to terrorists, can not be

ignored because the fortunes of terrorism depend largely on the response
it encounters both from the public and authorities.

With the Cold War

over and the superpowers no longer assuming responsibility for maintain
ing peace and stability within their respective spheres of influence, a
greater burden has naturally fallen on the responsible nations of world
community to cope with terrorism through international cooperation
through world organization including the United Nations.
But the stark reality of the international community is not so
friendly to international cooperation to cope with terrorism.

Although

the international community appears to recognize the needs for coopera
tion against terrorism, national interests have dominated the treatment
of the issue and unanimity has been rhetorical rather than practicable.
There can be no doubt that sensitivity to political implication of the
issue of terrorism has limited international cooperation.

The search

for juridical solution in the United Nations has not been notably suc
cessful.

Many Western observers agree that realistically the United Na-

104

105

tions is not the best forum for cooperation against terrorism.

In fact,

in the U.S. perspective, inability to agree on condemning terrorism has
discredited the United Nations.
ties, as well as the

Given the universal scope of UN trea

controversial nature of terrorism, it is not sur

prising that international treaties are often ineffective because of un
derstanding and reluctant implementation.
Also, we must concede that, despite the potential advantage of
counter-terrorism, its usage remains controversial for at least three
reasons.

First, counter-terrorism is very difficult to execute, and

even when done effectively it may cause the government to act in ways
that the public may find morally and culturally unacceptable.

Second,

there is disagreement over whether a legal or military approach should
be taken.

Finally, counter terrorism is not the function of any one

government agency, which creates a jurisdictional tangle that hinders
the development of effective counter-terrorism policy. 1
In addition, the difficulty of engaging in counter-terrorism has at
least some interactive aspects.

First, terrorist groups are clandestine

organization headquartered in unfriendly countries where, for instance,
U.S. intelligence assets may be deficient in Syria and Iraq.

This dif

ficulty was evident in the American hostage problem in Lebanon: most of
the difficulty was in finding the hostages.
lem of initiative.

Second, there is the prob

Although counter-terrorism is intended to take the

initiative away from the terrorist, the terrorist effectiveness comes
from attacking at unexpected times in places impossible to target.
Third, there is related a problem of the idiosyncrasy of terrorist acts.
Each terrorist act is very different in terms of anticipating when or if
it will occur.

Thus, anti-terrorist activities may prevent one terror
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ist act but have no effect on another.

A fourth, difficulty is that

terrorists are often accorded government protection by the countries in
which they operate.

The counter-terrorist must overcome not only the

terrorist but also the host government.
The fifth problem involves identifying the center of gravity of the
terrorist organization -- who and what to attack.

Successful terrorists

seek to imbed themselves in the population so as to make their identifi
cation more difficult as well as to make it harder for others to attack
them without alienating the population.

Sixth, many of the most effec

tive counter-terrorist acts suffer from cultural offensiveness to most
Americans.

Effective action of anti-terrorism may cover a range of ac

tions, up to and including the assassination of known terrorists.

The

US government is prohibited from abetting or committing assassinations,
which is a reflection of American cultural value. 2
During the Cold War, the two superpowers defined the "red lines" of
international behavior, signaling to other nation-states and political
groupings what activities were off-limits because they threatened the
interests of bi-polar contestants.

Now, the Security Council, more than

the East-West framework can be the forum in which those red line
drawn.

are

If it chooses, the Security Council can define a structure for

managing the use of force that would increase the clarity of its deci
sion-making and the predictability of its actions.

The various actors

in today's civil war-like conflicts are unrestrained by a awareness of
"red lines" and

of whom will set or enforce them.

Establishing limits

will take time, but unless it is done, the alternative may be interna
tional anarchy.

Yet, there are other roles that this new era has

107

brought upon the various UN institutions.

The end of the Cold War has

implicitly given the United Nations the monumental task of redefining
the concept of enemy.
the most

The institution of the Secretary General may be

appropriate to that task.

It has to rally the world community

against its new enemy -- intolerance -- and the Security Council has to
draw the "red lines" of the emerging international system.

Otherwise,

member states produce leaders who can lead without an enemy. 3
Actually, following the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has
greatly expanded its peace making and peace keeping operations around
the world.

Between 1991 and 1992 the United nations established 13 new

peace keeping operations - - exactly the number initiated by the world
body in its entire previous 42 years of its existence.

At the start of

1993, UN peace keeping forces were serving in Angola, Cambodia, Cyprus,
El Salvador, Golan Heights, Kashimir, along the Kuait-Iraqi border, in
Lebanon, Mozambique, the Sinai, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and
Western Sahara; all told some 60,000 military and police personnel were
involved in these operations, with the number expected to increase sub
stantially in the future.
These operations have contributed to stability in many parts of the
globe and given the United Nations enhanced international visibility and
respectability.

And while some of the operations have run into diffi

culties, most observers agree that conditions in these areas would
probably be much worse without the presence of the blue helmets.
Nevertheless, world leaders generally agree that the United Na
tions' current capabilities and methods are inadequate for the wide
range of conflicts and security challenges expected in years to come.
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The Security Council has called on Secretary General Boutros BoutrosGhali and his staff to suggest ways in which organizations and peacemak
ing activities can be improved.

Development and implementation of this

suggestion is likely to be the organization's top priority in the mid1990s.

To inform the discussion of peacemaking, Boutros Ghali published

An Agenda for Peace in June 1992. * In this document, the Secretary Gen
eral identifies five key areas in need of improvement: preventive diplo
macy, or the negotiated termination of conflicts; peacemaking,
peacekeeping, or use of United Nations forces to monitor cease-fire and
to prevent the reignition of hostilities; peace enforcement, or the use
of force to prevent or resist aggression by a belligerent in violation
of United Nation's resolutions; and post-conflict peace-building de
signed to alleviate human suffering and thus eliminate conditions that
might contribute to the renewal of fighting.

Boutros-Ghali proposed a

number of initiatives in each of these areas, and broke new ground by
calling for the formation of a permanent peacekeeping force under UN
control.
The development of new approaches to local and regional

conflicts

has also been the matter of great concern in the United States, which
has been under great pressure to step in resolve certain ongoing crises
(notably those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somali). While the Ameri
can leaders would prefer to delegate all such activities to the United
Nations, others, including both President George Bush and Bill Clinton,
contend that the United States has an obligation to act in certain cases
where no other option appears viable.

Thus in December 1992, President

Bush, with only six weeks left in his term, ordered United States forces
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to Somalia in order to restore order in a country torn by fictional war
fare and to protect the delivery of relief supplies to starving Somalis.
In announcing "Operation Restore Hope," the President indicated that the
United States cannot assume such responsibility in every instance of re
gional disorder, but that it must be prepared to act when the survival
of many human beings is at stake and when no other entity is available
to do the job.

"I understand [that] the United States cannot right the

world's wrongs, but we also know that some crises in the world cannot be
resolved without American involvement[and that] American action is often
necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of na
tions."

These comments, and the dispatch of American troops to Somali,

sparked a heated debate in the United States over where and under what
circumstances United States forces should be employed in such operations
abroad.
Whatever the outcome in the United States and at the United Nations
on the use of force in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, it is
apparent that the problem of preventing

and controlling local, ethnic,

and regional conflicts has become the premier world security concern of
the post Cold War era.

Because such conflicts are likely to proliferate

in the years ahead, and because no single power or group is willing and
able to guarantee global peace and stability, United States and world
leaders will be forced to enhance existing peace-keeping instruments and
to develop new techniques along the lines suggested by
eral Boutros-Ghali.

Secretary Gen

How peaceful a world we inhabit in the twenty-first

century will depend to a great extent on these endeavors.
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